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ABSTRACT 
 
The meltdown of Fukushima Daiichi’s nuclear plant was one of three disasters that rocked Japan 
on 11 March 2011, a day often referred to as “3.11.”  This nuclear accident led to increased 
attention to and disapproval of nuclear power among the Japanese public.  However, despite 
widespread antinuclear sentiment, the public did not mobilize into sustained mass protests until 
June 2012.  Using historical and contemporary comparisons, this thesis shows that Japan’s 15-
month delay in antinuclear mobilization was unusual.  Both the 1979 Three Mile Island and the 
1986 Chernobyl accidents had been quickly followed by mobilized protests.  Moreover, the 3.11 
Fukushima meltdown prompted mass protests in Germany almost immediately.  Given these 
patterns, one would expect to have seen the Japanese mobilize earlier.  The question that drives 
this thesis is: What	  led	  to	  Japan’s	  15-­‐month	  delay	  in	  antinuclear	  power	  mobilization?   
 
Using social movement theory, I test to see whether low levels of grievance, limited availability 
of resources, or the lack of effective mobilizing structure and strategy help to explain this delay.  
Of the three explanations, I find the mobilization structure and strategy explanation to be best 
supported.  Due to a history of overlooking antinuclear power issues in Japanese civil society, 
the early post-3.11 movement lacked longstanding true believers and activists, the two types of 
participants most effective at mobilizing.  Furthermore, the use of social media platforms to 
organize the early protests may have contributed to why sustained protests were delayed.  The 
empirical findings from this thesis allow us to examine more closely the devastation resulting 
from 3.11’s nuclear meltdown and assess the strengths and weaknesses in Japanese civil society 
after the disaster.  On a theoretical level, these findings may encourage us to question the 
relevance of grievance to mobilization, refine how resource availability is measured, and ask if 
the growing use of social media and other online tools should change the way we study social 
movement mobilization. 
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Section 1 
Introduction 
1.1 – Research Question 
On 11 March 2011, Japan experienced an earthquake that measured 9.0 in magnitude, a 
tsunami that stood 30 feet high at its peak, and a nuclear meltdown.  This triple disaster, often 
referred to as “3.11,” had devastating effects on the nation.  This thesis studies the post-3.11 
antinuclear power movement in Japan.  Despite widespread antinuclear sentiment reported 
among the public due to the 3.11 meltdown of the Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO)’s 
Fukushima Daiichi nuclear plant, the Japanese people failed to mobilize in sustained mass 
protests until 15 months later.  What led to the delay in mobilization?  
 
1.2 – Background on the 3.11 Nuclear Disaster and Resulting Protests 
The meltdown of TEPCO’s Fukushima Daiichi nuclear plant had long-lasting 
consequences, including fear over safety issues, uncertainty about recovery, and anger towards 
the national government for downplaying the financial and human cost of nuclear energy.  
Kingston describes the impact the 3.11 nuclear accident had on the public: 
The catastrophe at Fukushima, defined by apocalyptic images of reactor buildings 
blowing up and abandoned communities, has seared a place in the collective 
memory where nightmares usually reside….The public now understands that for 
all the failsafe technological safeguards, the sheen is off nuclear power because 
human error and institutionalized failure to properly assess and manage risk 
generates vulnerabilities….Perhaps over time concerns will diminish as people 
get on with their lives, but trust has imploded and a line has been crossed.1 
 
Antinuclear sentiment began to take root after the disaster.  Within half a year after the accident, 
public opinion surveys showed that the majority of Japanese people switched from supporting 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Jeff Kingston, Contemporary Japan: History, Politics, and Social Change since the 1980s  
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nuclear power to opposing it.2  In addition to phasing out reliance on nuclear energy, people 
began to call for the dismantling of the “’nuclear village,’ [a] shorthand for the policy 
community in which energy policy [had] been made.”3  However, despite the surge of 
antinuclear sentiment, mass protests against nuclear power did not erupt immediately.  While the 
“general public may have turned antinuclear…in political terms it remained relatively 
immobilized for more than a year after the accident.”4  In fact, it took fifteen months for the 
antinuclear movement to mobilize into the sustained mass protests that made headlines around 
the world during the summer of 2012.   
On 16 July 2012, tens of thousands of Japanese stood before the Prime Minister’s office 
to protest the restart of the second nuclear plant since the disaster.  Both local and international 
news outlets highlighted the fact that this was the country’s largest public demonstration since 
the early 1960s.  I argue that the surprising thing was not the size of these protests but why they 
took so long to erupt in the first place.  What led to the delay in antinuclear power mobilization? 
Asking this question is important to the study of social movements because it requires 
establishing a time frame of how long it takes for mobilization to occur in comparable situations.  
This measurement of mobilization timing does not appear in the existing literature on post-
accident antinuclear movements I have surveyed.  Additionally, accounting for the delay in 
mobilization is important to understanding contemporary Japanese politics.  It prompts a closer 
examination of the suffering that arose from the 3.11 nuclear meltdown and an assessment of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 "Public Opinion Survey by Japanese Mass Media,"  Japan Atomic Industrial Forum, June 
2011,(http://www.jaif.or.jp/english/news_images/pdf/ENGNEWS02_1320397876P.pdf). 
 
3 Richard J. Samuels, 3.11: Disaster and Change in Japan  (Cornell University Press, 2013), 118. 
 
4 Ibid., 131. 
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strengths and weaknesses of local antinuclear efforts.  Findings from this thesis allow us to 
understand more clearly the state of Japanese civil society after the 3.11 disaster.   
 In this thesis, I explain the post-3.11 antinuclear power movement along the lines of 
social movement theory.  Specifically, I generate and test three hypotheses – one from grievance-
focused theory and two from internal-capacities focused theory – that could explain the Japan’s 
delayed mobilization.  The evidence I find shows that grievance theory does not offer a suitable 
explanation for the delay.  Likewise, (internal-capacities-focused) resource availability theory 
also cannot account fully for the late start of mobilized protest.  However, I find that (internal-
capacities-focused) mobilization structure theory offers a compelling explanation for the delayed 
emergence of sustained mass protests.  Due to the historical lack of successful antinuclear power 
activism in Japan and the preponderance of amateur protesters present at the early 
demonstrations, the Japanese antinuclear power movement did not have at their disposal the type 
of protesters that are more effective at mobilizing.  The findings from this thesis suggest that the 
delay in Japan’s post-3.11 antinuclear mobilization can be understood by looking inside the 
capacities of the movement and specifically at its mobilization structure and strategy.      
 
1.3 – Theoretical Background of Protest Mobilization  
To understand the delayed emergence of sustained mass protests after the Fukushima 
disaster, I turn to social movement literature that studies the factors influencing mobilization 
after a “suddenly imposed grievance.”  I define “suddenly imposed grievance” the same way 
Walsh did when he created the term: an unexpected, dramatic, large-scale event that makes 
	   9	  
people aware of and opposed to a particular grievance. 5  Three general theories emerge from this 
literature: first, grievance-focused theory (which emphasizes the level of suffering and 
deprivation that arise due to the event); second, internal capacities-focused theory (which 
emphasizes availability and mobilization of resources); and third, external conditions-focused 
theory (which emphasizes political factors external to the movement such as electoral systems, 
constitutions, and state capacities to suppress).  Each of these theories privilege different factors 
that encourage or limit the emergence of mobilization, offering different explanations for why a 
delay like the one after Fukushima could take place. 
 
1.3.1 – Terms and Concepts 
Before discussing each theory, first, I define relevant terms and concepts such as social 
movements and contentious politics.  Social movements are “networks of informal interaction 
between a plurality of individuals, groups and/or organizations, engaged in a political or cultural 
conflict on the basis of a shared collective identity.”6  Social movements that express political 
discontent and disagreement through protests and demonstrations are one form of contentious 
politics.  McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly define contentious politics as “episodic, public, collective 
interaction among makers of claims and their objects when (a) at least one government is a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Edward J. Walsh, "Resource Mobilization and Citizen Protest in Communities around Three 
Mile Island," Social Problems 29, no. 1 (1981). 
 
6 Mario Diani, "The Concept of Social Movement," The Sociological Review 40, no. 1 (1992): 13. 
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claimant, an object of claims, or a party to the claims and (b) the claims would, if realized, affect 
the interests of at least one of the claimants.”7  
 
1.3.2 – Grievance 
Grievance-focused theory, which dominated social movement theory until the 1970s, sees 
protest mobilization as a result of deprivation and accumulated grievances.  Grievances can be 
measured objectively (e.g. income, pollution level, radiation level) or subjectively (e.g. perceived 
prejudice, negative attitudes about policy, fear of radiation).  People protest because they suffer 
but cannot express their discontent through formal channels or address their problems through 
institutionalized means.8  Grievance theorists such as Gurr, Turner and Kilian, and Smelser hold 
that shared grievances are a necessary, if not sufficient, condition for the emergence of protests; 
they predict that the greater the deprivation and grievance, the more likely protest mobilization is 
to occur. 9  However, they have often been criticized for not being able to support their claims 
about the relationship between deprivation and movement mobilization empirically.10 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Doug McAdam, Sidney Tarrow, and Charles Tilly, Dynamics of Contention  (Cambridge 
University Press, 2001), 5. 
 
8 Ted Gurr, "Psychological Factors in Civil Violence," World Politics 20, no. 02 (1968). 
 
9 ———, Why Men Rebel  (Paradigm Publishers, 2010); Neil J. Smelser, Theory of Collective 
Behavior  (Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1962); Ralph H. Turner and Lewis M. Killian, Collective Behavior  
(Prentice-Hall, 1972). 
 
10 D. Bowen et al., "Deprivation, Mobility, and Orientation toward Protest of the Urban Poor," in 
Riots and Rebellion: Civil Violence in the Urban Community, ed. D. Bowen and L. Masotti (Beverly Hills, 
CA: Sage, 1968); T. J. Crawford and M.  Naditch, "Relative Deprivation, Powerlessness and Militancy: 
The Psychology of Social Protest," Psychiatry 33, no. May (1970); Edward N. Mueller, "A Test of a 
Partial Theory of Potential for Political Violence," American Political Science Review 66, no. September 
(1972); David Snyder and Charles Tilly, "Hardship and Collective Violence in France, 1830 to 1960," 
American Sociological Review 37, no. 5 (1972). 
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In spite of these criticisms, grievance-focused theory continued to be utilized for studying 
ecological and antinuclear movements, which are relevant to my research question.  I provide 
three examples from the literature.  First, to explain the rates of participation in the ecology 
movement in Greece, Inglehart highlighted the fact that "metropolitan Athens probably has the 
most severe pollution problems of any major city in the European community."11 Second, to 
explain the mobilization of the German environmental movement, Wilson provided the 
following account:  
In West Germany, the construction of nuclear energy plants and pollution damage 
to the Germans' beloved forests served to mobilize public support for the 
environmental movement.  In France, however, there was no such mobilizing 
issue...The absence of such a central cause retarded the development of all social 
movements.12 
 
Third, to explain the emergence of antinuclear energy protests after the Three Mile Island 
nuclear accident, Walsh demonstrated that an increase in mobilization took place only after the 
accident.13  These examples suggest that grievances can encourage environmental and 
antinuclear protest mobilization.   
However, the antinuclear protests that resulted from the Chernobyl disaster, which is 
perhaps the closest comparison to the Fukushima case, suggest that “suddenly imposed grievance” 
from an event like a nuclear accident is, on its own, not the best explanation for mobilization of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Ronald Inglehart, Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Society  (Princeton University Press, 
1990), 379. 
 
12 Frank Lee Wilson, "Neo-Corporatism and the Rise of New Social Movements," in Challenging 
the Political Order. New Social and Political Movements in Western Democracies, ed. Russell J.  Dalton 
and Manfred Kuechler (Cambridge/Oxford: Polity Press, 1990), 80. 
 
13 Walsh, "Resource Mobilization and Citizen Protest in Communities around Three Mile Island." 
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protests.  Koopsman and Duyvendak argue that other situational factors should be considered as 
well:  
The [Chernobyl] accident brought about protest reactions in all Western European 
countries, and it may be that without Chernobyl the rise of anti-nuclear protest in 
Germany would have been less spectacular. [Even so], the results show that the 
effects of a suddenly imposed grievance such as the Chernobyl disaster are 
conditioned by situational factors such as the state of the anti-nuclear movement 
at the time of the accident, the political situation in which it occurred, and the 
outcome of the interpretive struggle between the anti-nuclear movement and pro-
nuclear authorities.14   
 
In other words, high levels of grievance alone were not sufficient to prompt protest mobilization 
after Chernobyl; instead, external conditions and internal capacities that welcomed antinuclear 
movement mobilization also had to be present.   
Can grievance theory explain Japan’s post-3.11 mobilization delay?  Based on grievance 
theory, one possible hypothesis to explain the delay is:  
• Hypothesis 1: Immediately following the 3.11 disaster, there was insufficient 
grievance (objectively and subjectively) to spur mobilization of sustained 
mass protests. 
In Section 2, I examine this hypothesis and ultimately conclude that it is uncompelling.  Using 
comparative cases, I demonstrate how the fifteen-month delay in Japan’s antinuclear 
mobilization was significant and unexpected given the high level of grievance caused by the 
Fukushima disaster.  European countries such as Germany mobilized into mass protests 
immediately after 3.11, while Japan – which experienced the bulk of the radiation problem 
(objective grievance) as well as the negative public attitudes towards nuclear energy (subjective 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Ruud Koopmans and Jan Willem  Duyvendak, "The Political Construction of the Nuclear 
Energy Issue and Its Impact on the Mobilization of Anti-Nuclear Movements in Western Europe," Social 
Problems 42, no. 2 (1995): 241. 
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grievances) – did not mobilize until fifteen months later.  These comparisons make clear that 
grievance theory is not the best theory to understand the post 3-11 protest mobilization in Japan.  
Instead of focusing on the event and resulting grievance, some scholars have turned to 
internal capacities or external conditions to explain why mobilization might be promoted or 
hampered.  As Koopsman and Duyvendak write, “What matters for mobilization is not the 
availability of problems but a social movement's internal capacities (resources) and external 
opportunities (political process) to do something about them.”15  
 
1.3.3 – Internal Capacities (Resources and Mobilization Structure)  
Gauging the internal capacities of a movement requires a look at its available resources as 
well as its mobilization structure and strategy.  According to Edwards and McCarthy, “putting 
resources at the center of the analysis of social movement processes” can give insight into a 
group’s ability to “mobilize effectively.”16   Theorists focused on the internal capacities of a 
movement argue that "there is always enough discontent in any society to supply grass-roots 
support for a movement if the movement is effectively organized and has at its disposal the 
power and resources of some established group."17  Internal capacities-focused theory places 
availability of resources and effective mobilization structure and strategy at the center of its 
analysis.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Ibid., 236. 
 
16 Bob Edwards and John D. McCarthy, "Resources and Social Movement Mobilization," in The 
Blackwell Companion to Social Movements, ed. David A. Snow, Sarah A. Soule, and Hanspeter Kriesi 
(Oxford: John Wiley & Sons, 2004), 142. 
 
17 John D. McCarthy and Mayer N. Zald, "Resource Mobilization and Social Movements: A 
Partial Theory," The American Journal of Sociology 82, no. 6 (1977): 1215. 
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To begin, what resources enable mobilization?   Edwards and McCarthy worked to 
specify and conceptualize “resources” by developing a “fivefold typology of moral, cultural, 
social-organizational, human, and material resources”18: 
1. Moral– Moral resources include solidarity, celebrity, legitimacy, and support for a 
movement’s goals.19   
2. Cultural -- "Cultural resources are artifacts and cultural products such as conceptual tools 
and specified knowledge that have become widely…known.  These include tacit 
knowledge about how to accomplish specific tasks like enacting a protest event, holding a 
news conference, running a meeting, forming an organization, initiating a festival, or 
surfing the web.”20  Cultural resources can also include movement-relevant literature, 
newspapers, magazines, films, and music that help to recruit and socialize movement 
participants.21 
3. Social-organizational – Intentionally created or appropriated to further a movement’s 
goals, social organizational resources come mainly in three forms:  “infrastructures, 
social networks, and organizations.”22  The availability of social-organizational resources 
in a particular setting increases the likelihood that mobilization would take there.23  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Edwards and McCarthy, "Resources and Social Movement Mobilization," 117. 
 
19 Daniel M. Cress and David A.  Snow, "Mobilization at the Margins: Resources, Benefactors, 
and the Viability of Homeless Social Movement Organizations," American Sociological Review 61, no. 6 
(1996). 
 
20 Edwards and McCarthy, "Resources and Social Movement Mobilization," 126. 
 
21 Ibid. 
 
22 Ibid., 127. 
 
23 Ibid. 
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Social-organizational resources are the most context-dependent and least transferable of 
the different types of resources. 
4. Human – Human resources refer to a movement’s volunteers, staff, or leaders and the 
human capital (labor, skills and expertise, experience) that they bring.  “A movement’s 
capacity to deploy personnel is limited by the cooperation of the individuals involved 
[and] their participation is in turn shaped by spatial and economic factors as well as by 
social relationships, competing obligations, life-course constraints, and moral 
commitments.”24  
5. Material – Material resources refer to money and physical capital (such as property, 
office space, supplies, and equipment).  Edwards and McCarthy write:  “Monetary 
resources have received the most analytic attention and there are good reasons for that.  
Money is a necessity. No matter how many other resources a movement mobilizes it will 
incur costs and someone has to pay the bills.”25  This type of resource is measurable and 
fungible.26  For example, money can be used to purchase access to other resources that a 
movement may lack.   
Studies by Minkoff and Soule lend support to the theory that resource availability positively 
correlates with the rate of protests.27  Additionally, McLaughlin and Khawaja and Dalton show 
how resources have played a role in the emergence of environmental organizations in the United 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 Ibid., 128. 
 
25 ibid. 
 
26 ibid., 129. 
 
27 Debra C. Minkoff, "The Sequencing of Social Movements," American Sociological Review 62, 
no. 5 (1997); Sarah A. Soule, "The Student Divestment Movement in the United States and Tactical 
Diffusion: The Shantytown Protest," Social Forces 74, no. 3 (1997). 
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States and in Western Europe respectively.28  All of these findings add strong empirical support 
to the claims made by mobilization theorists who linked resource availability to mobilization.29  
Can resource availability-focused theory explain the delay in Japan’s post-3.11 
mobilization?  One resource-related hypothesis is: 
• Hypothesis 2a:  After the triple disaster, resources available to the 
antinuclear movement were limited, thus the antinuclear movement was 
prevented from taking off immediately and effectively. 
Section 3 of this thesis tests whether the fifteen-month mobilization delay in Japan can be linked 
to scarcity of resources: moral resources in the form of mass media attention, cultural resources 
in the form of protest know-how, and material resources in the form of money.   I find that with 
the exception of moral resources, the antinuclear movement did not experience a limitation of 
resources.  With these mixed results, this section shows that focusing on resource availability is 
not the best way to understand the post-3.11 mobilization delay.    
 Aside from examining resource limitations or availabilities, another way to connect a 
movement’s internal capacities to mobilization is to see if the structures and strategies needed for 
effective mobilization are present.  As Edwards and McCarthy write, "simple availability of 
resources is not sufficient; coordination and strategic effort is typically required in order to 
convert available pools of individually held resources into collective resources and to utilize 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 Russell J Dalton, The Green Rainbow: Environmental Groups in Western Europe  (Yale 
University Press New Haven, CT, 1994); Paul McLaughlin and Marwan Khawaja, "The Organizational 
Dynamics of the U.S. Environmental Movement: Legitimation, Resource Mobilization, and Political 
Opportunity," Rural Sociology 65, no. 3 (2000). 
 
29 J. Craig Jenkins, The Politics of Insurgency: The Farm Worker Movement in the 1960s  
(Columbia University Press, 1985); John D. McCarthy and Mayer N. Zald, The Trend of Social 
Movements in America: Professionalization and Resource Mobilization  (Morristown, N.J.: General 
Learning Press, 1973); ———, "Resource Mobilization and Social Movements: A Partial Theory." 
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those resources in collective action."30  Among the five different resource types, social-
organizational and human resources are particularly necessary for organizational efforts.  
Because social-organizational resources act to “provide access to other resources,” their absence 
would limit a movement’s “capacity to access crucial resources of other kinds,” resulting in 
lessened ability to mobilize.31  Human resources are also important given that it is people who 
have to do the work of organizing and strategizing.  Goodwin and Jasper make clear the 
importance of movement participants, writing that “social movements emerge when…would-be 
‘insurgents have available to them “mobilizing structures” of sufficient strength to get the 
movement off the ground’ and ‘feel both aggrieved about some aspect of their lives and 
optimistic that, acting collectively, they can redress the problem.’”32  These mobilizing structures 
are understood as social networks and organizations. 
Central to mobilization structure and strategy are a movement’s participants because they 
provide the social networks needed for mobilization to occur.  Different types of participants in a 
movement bring varying levels of human resources (e.g. experience, skills), as Edwards and 
McCarthy describe: 
Clearly, not all adherents offer the same mix of capabilities.  A savvy and 
seasoned activist is not directly interchangeable with an eager undergraduate, no 
matter how effective the student may become with additional experience.33  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 Edwards and McCarthy, "Resources and Social Movement Mobilization," 116. 
 
31 Ibid., 127. 
 
32 Jeff Goodwin and James M. Jasper, Rethinking Social Movements: Structure, Meaning, and 
Emotion  (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2004), 17. 
 
33 Edwards and McCarthy, "Resources and Social Movement Mobilization," 128. 
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Scholars have identified four different types of participants in a protest: (1) true believers (long-
standing adherents to a cause who experienced full conversion and are committed to 
proselytizing and ready to sacrifice their lives for a cause); (2) activists (who join pro-democratic, 
liberal, human rights-type movements); (3) citizens centered around a common good (based on 
specific ideas, issues, and goals); and (4) spontaneous protesters (who form episodic protest 
actions in response to various government actions).34  True believers and activists are more 
predisposed to protesting and more effective at mobilizing support.35   
An hypothesis explaining the delayed timing of the post-3.11 antinuclear movement can 
be derived from mobilization structure-focused theory: 
• Hypothesis 2b:  The early post-3.11 antinuclear movement was composed of 
spontaneous protesters and regular citizens organized over one issue rather 
than true believers or activists, who are generally more effective in mobilizing 
support, thus explaining why mobilization did not occur immediately 
following the Fukushima disaster. 
In Section 4, I test this hypothesis to see if there was a lack of antinuclear true believers and 
activists in Japan, an internal capacities condition that would discourage mobilization.  The 
evidence I find suggests that there was, indeed, a lack of antinuclear true believers and activists 
due to a longstanding “nuclear blind spot” in Japanese civil society.  The preponderance of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 Bert Klandermans, The Social Psychology of Protest  (Wiley, 1997); Doug McAdam, 
"Recruitment to High-Risk Activism: The Case of Freedom Summer," American Journal of Sociology 92, 
no. 1 (1986); Pamela Oliver, "If You Don't Do It, Nobody Else Will: Active and Token Contributors to 
Local Collective Action," American Sociological Review 49, no. 5 (1984); Greg Wiltfang and Doug 
McAdam, "Distinguishing Cost and Risk in Sanctuary Activism," Social Forces 69(1991). 
 
35 Florence Passy and Marco Giugni, "Social Networks and Individual Perceptions: Explaining 
Differential Participation in Social Movements," Sociological Forum 16, no. 1 (2001): 129. 
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amateur protesters offers an explanation for the movement’s lack of sustained mass mobilization.   
 
1.3.4 – External Conditions (Political Opportunity Structure) 
External conditions-focused theory examines political opportunities to explain the ease or 
difficulty of mobilization that protest movements might experience.  Tarrow defines political 
opportunities as “dimensions of the political environment that provide incentives for people to 
undertake collective action by affecting their expectations for success or failure.”36  Political 
opportunity theory privileges long-term structural factors such as electoral systems, 
administrative structures, constitutions, and states’ capacities for repression.  Although “political 
opportunity” can be measured in a variety of different ways depending on how broadly or 
narrowly a social movement analyst defines the term, McAdam highlights four political factors 
he believes to be a “highly consensual list of dimensions of political opportunity”: 
1. The relative openness or closure of the institutionalized political system 
2. The stability or instability of that broad set of elite alignments that typically undergird 
a polity 
3. The presence or absence of elite allies 
4. The state’s capacity and propensity for repression37 
The degree of openness of a system can either encourage or discourage mobilization.  Political 
opportunity structure theory predicts a “curvilinear relationship between openness and movement 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 Sidney G. Tarrow, Power in Movement: Social Movements, Collective Action and Politics  
(Cambridge University Press, 1994), 85. 
 
37 Doug McAdam, "Political Opportunities: Conceptual Origins, Current Problems, Future 
Directions," in Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements, ed. Doug McAdam, John McCarthy, and 
Mayer Zald (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 27. 
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mobilization, [in which] very closed regimes repress social movements…very open and 
responsive ones assimilate them, and moderately repressive ones allow for their broad 
articulation but do not accede readily to their demands.”38  In other words, only moderately 
closed systems prompt protests.39   
Political opportunity structure theory offers the following explanation for why Japan did 
not experience mass demonstrations immediately after 3.11: 
• Hypothesis 3:  Either Japan had a very closed system of decision-making that 
repressed protests or a very open system of decision-making that assimilated 
opposition, thus explaining why mobilization of the antinuclear power 
movement did not occur immediately following the 3.11 disaster. 
I do not conduct a detailed test of this hypothesis in this thesis.  First, based on previous studies 
done on Japanese political opportunity structure and social mobilization, we know that Japan has 
a moderately closed system of decision-making.  It cannot be characterized as a very closed 
system based on the fact that it is not a repressive regime that prohibits protests and the voicing 
of oppositional views; however, there is evidence to show that it is closed.  Reimann describes 
Japan as a "highly centralized political system [with] limited access to channels of influence for 
outsiders.”40  Studying energy policy specifically, Hasegawa (2011) finds that Japan 
demonstrates “closed” political opportunities through “the centralized and closed nature of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 Herbert P. Kitschelt, "Political Opportunity Structures and Political Protest: Anti-Nuclear 
Movements in Four Democracies," British Journal of Political Science 16, no. 01 (1986): 62. 
 
39 Ibid., 70. 
 
40 Kim D. Reimann, "Building Networks from the Outside In: Japanese Ngos and the Kyoto 
Climate Change Conference," in Globalization and Resistance: Transnational Dimensions of Social 
Movements, ed. Jackie Smith and Hank Johnston (Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2002), 175. 
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Japanese policy decision-making, monopolized by central ministries, a single ruling party, and 
concentrated big business.”41  He argues that nuclear energy policy is bureaucratic-led, with 
Japan’s Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) “strongly protecting the utility’s 
interest.”42  Furthermore, local government has retained only a “very small legal authority on this 
[nuclear energy] issue” thus failing to hold the pro-nuclear energy national government 
accountable.43  Japan’s institutional arrangements leave little room for public interests to be 
expressed in the political system, making it more likely that citizens who oppose the country’s 
energy policy direction would resort to confrontational tactics such as protests.  Given what we 
know about Japanese political structure generally and more specifically to energy policy, 
Hypothesis 3 does not appear to be supported.  Second, political opportunities would be more 
useful in explaining the form rather than the speed of mobilization, the latter of which is the 
focus of my thesis.  According to Goodwin and Jasper, political opportunities rarely eliminate 
the possibility of protests altogether, but instead serve as “institutional avenues that channel 
protest in certain ways rather than others.”44  For example, “political action is invited to go down 
legal rather than illegal routes, electoral rather than disruptive channels, into hierarchical rather 
than egalitarian organizational forms.”45  Due to these reasons, I limit the scope of my 
investigation to grievance and internal capacities while knowing that social movements do not 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 Jeffrey Broadbent, "Introduction: East Asian Social Movements," in East Asian Social 
Movements: Power, Protest, and Change in a Dynamic Region, ed. Jeffrey Broadbent and Vicky 
Brockman (New York: Springer, 2011), 17. 
 
42 Koichi Hasegawa, "A Comparative Study of Social Movements for a Post-Nuclear Energy Era 
in Japan and the USA," in East Asian Social Movements: Power, Protest, and Change in a Dynamic 
Region, ed. Jeffrey Broadbent and Vicky Brockman (New York: Springer, 2011), 74. 
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44 Goodwin and Jasper, Rethinking Social Movements: Structure, Meaning, and Emotion: 12. 
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emerge in a vacuum, and that government, political structure, and policy matter.  
1.4 – Method 
In the following sections, I use historical comparisons to establish that the Japanese 
fifteen-month delay in protest mobilization was indeed different that in the past.  Then, I test 
each of my three proposed hypotheses – generated from grievance and internal capacity theories 
– in turn.  To gather empirical evidence on protest activities, participants, and public attitudes, I 
use protest event analysis (PEA) and rely mainly on information from books, journal articles, 
research reports, newspaper articles, published interviews, and public opinion polls.     
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Section 2  
15-Month Delay and Grievance 
In this section, I demonstrate that the fifteen-month delay in Japan’s antinuclear 
mobilization was unexpected given the speed of protest mobilization in comparative cases and 
the high level of grievance caused by the Fukushima nuclear disaster.  The first half of this 
section examines mobilizations after Three Mile Island, Chernobyl, and Fukushima, and the 
second half describes the high level of objective and subjective grievances present in Japan as a 
result of the 3.11 nuclear meltdown.  
 
2.1 – Significant 15-Month Delay in Protest Mobilization  
 The Japanese public staged several demonstrations throughout 2011 and early 2012, but 
the antinuclear movement was not yet mobilized at the time.  These gatherings were smaller, 
isolated, or not organized by a coordinated effort from antinuclear organizations.46  I define 
mobilization as the coordinated assembling of a wide range of civilians to demand a particular 
objective through consistent large public gatherings such as demonstrations or protest rallies.  By 
this definition, it was not until June 2012 that sustained mass antinuclear mobilization finally 
began to occur.  To show that Japan’s 15-month delay in mobilization is a puzzle worth 
exploring, I establish the typical length of time it takes for people to mobilize in protests after a  
comparable event.  Was Japan’s post-3.11 antinuclear mobilization indeed slow? 
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2.1.1 – Mobilization Speed in Comparative Context 
First, to put Japan’s mobilization delay in perspective, I compare it historically to the 
mobilization of the antinuclear movements in the United States after the Three Mile Island 
disaster and in West Germany after the Chernobyl disaster.  These historical comparisons allow 
me to establish how long a country affected by a sudden, large-scale nuclear disaster typically 
takes to mobilize.  The Three Mile Island accident occurred on 28 March 1979 and led to “rapid 
and widespread mobilization” of antinuclear protests in the United States.47  According to Cable, 
Walsh, and Warland, “citizens rapidly organized, with significant outside help from the national 
antinuclear movement…to begin what turned out to be a multi-year struggle against the utility 
and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC).”48  In fact, just a few days after the accident at 
Three Mile Island, several veteran activists organized a rally at the Capitol on April 6th, which 
drew “approximately 1,000 people” and marked “an important early event in the area's 
widespread protest mobilization.” 49  Their effort saw immediate results: “within weeks, veteran 
activists from the 1960s had taken over leadership positions in [plant’s watchdog, Three Mile 
Island Alert (TMIA)], and transformed the Harrisburg [social movement organizations (SMO)] 
into a coalition representing local groups from numerous area communities.”50  One month later 
on 6 May 1979, these veteran activists organized a national anti-nuclear rally in Washington, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 Walsh, "Resource Mobilization and Citizen Protest in Communities around Three Mile Island," 
17. 
 
48 Sherry Cable, Edward J. Walsh, and Rex H. Warland, "Differential Paths to Political Activism: 
Comparisons of Four Mobilization Processes after the Three Mile Island Accident," Social Forces 66, no. 
4 (1988): 953. 
 
49 Walsh, "Resource Mobilization and Citizen Protest in Communities around Three Mile Island," 
6. 
 
50 Ibid. 
 
	   25	  
D.C.  The rally drew an estimated 100,000 to 150,000 attendees and marked “another important 
event in [antinuclear] mobilization.”51  It seems that mass mobilization of antinuclear protests 
after the Three Mile Island accident occurred within the first two months of the disaster, a 
timeframe that is supported by Giugni’s account that "antinuclear protests [increased] rapidly 
[and reached] the highest level in 1979."52   
Another historical nuclear accident comparable to Fukushima is the Chernobyl disaster 
that took place on 26 April 1986 in the former USSR.  The disaster affected many countries in 
Western Europe, “Germany witnessed a spectacular rise in the number of antinuclear protest 
events [and showed] the largest increase in mobilization” while small increases took place in 
France and Switzerland.53  If I limit the selection of my comparative case to just Germany after 
Chernobyl (which mirrors post-Fukushima Japan in its high frequency of protest events and large 
numbers of protesters at the peak of its mobilization), Figure 1 and Figure 2 show that the peak 
of its mobilization took place immediately following Chernobyl, with the greatest numbers of 
protests and active participants in the year following the disaster.  Even if I include the small 
mobilizations in France and Switzerland, the same timing pattern holds true: Figure 1 and Figure 
2 show that the months immediately following the disaster saw the highest frequency of protests 
and numbers of protest participants. 
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Figure 1: Number of Protests of the Antinuclear Movement per Four-Month Period in Germany, 
France, Netherlands, and Switzerland 
Source: Koopmans and Duyvendak. "The Political Construction of the Nuclear Energy Issue and 
Its Impact on the Mobilization of Anti-Nuclear Movements in Western Europe”: 239. 
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Figure 2: Number of Participants in Actions of the Antinuclear Movement per Four-Month 
Period, per Million Inhabitants in Germany, France, Netherlands, and Switzerland 
Source: Koopmans and Duyvendak. "The Political Construction of the Nuclear Energy Issue and 
Its Impact on the Mobilization of Anti-Nuclear Movements in Western Europe”: 240. 
 
 
Given the timing of mass protests seen after the Three Mile Island and Chernobyl disasters, one 
would expect Japan to have followed the same pattern of rapid mobilization following 3.11, but 
instead, antinuclear mass mobilization did not begin until fifteen months later in June 2012. 
Second, comparing Japan’s mobilization to those happening in other countries – such as 
Germany – after 3.11. also illuminates the starkness of its 15-month delay in protest mobilization.  
This contemporary comparison allows me to isolate the effects of the Fukushima disaster.  In 
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crowds of more than 200,000.54  In response, Chancellor Angela Merkel immediately halted the 
extensions for the country’s existing nuclear power plants and temporarily shut down about half 
of the reactors that had been operating since 1981.  Later on 29 May 2011, the German 
government announced the closure of all its nuclear power plants by 2022, a drastic change given 
that nuclear power supplied about 27 percent of the country’s electricity at the time.55  Even after 
gaining ground with these promising government responses, German antinuclear groups 
continued to mobilize, and on the first anniversary of 3.11, about 50,000 people in six German 
regions came together to demonstrate against nuclear power.56  This sort of antinuclear 
movement – involving successful mass mobilization – was not found in Japan in the months 
following the disaster.  
 
2.1.2 – Japanese Mobilization  
 Not until June 2012 – 15 months after the Fukushima nuclear disaster – did coordinated, 
consistent, large protests begin in Japan.  To show numerically that Japanese society did not 
experience mass mobilization for a 15-month period, in Table 1, I compile a list of all the post-
3.11 protests that were reported online through news sites and other sources.  I record the date, 
location, organizer (if specified), and estimated attendance each demonstration.  Using just the 
date and the estimated attendance, I construct Figure 3, which shows graphically the trajectory of 
the antinuclear movement. 
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Table 1 
List of reported demonstrations after 3.11 
Date Location Organizer, if mentioned Estimated 
Attendance 
20-Mar-11 Shibuya  1,000 
27-Mar-11 Ginza  1,000 
10-Apr-11 Koenji Station  The Amateur’s Riot 15,000 
10-Apr-11 Shiba Park   2,500 
24-Apr-11 TEPCO Headquarters  3,000 
24-Apr-11 Shibuya Energy Shift 5,000 
26-Apr-11 TEPCO Headquarters Famers from Fukushima 350 
7-May-11 Shibuya The Amateur’s Riot 3,200 
11-Jun-11 Shinjuku Energy Shift 20,000 
11-Jun-11 Shiba Park Japan Congress Against A- and H-
Bombs], Citizens’ Nuclear Information 
Center, Consumers Union of Japan, 
Women’s Action Network, No Nukes 
Plaza. 
4,400 
11-Jun-11 Osaka  10,000 
11-Sep-11 TEPCO Headquarters  2,500 
11-Sep-11 Shibuya  900 
11-Sep-11 Shinjuku The Amateur’s Riot 20,000 
19-Sep-11 Meiji Park Oe Kenzaburo, Sawachi Hisae, Kamata 
Satoshi, Ochiai Keiko, and The Japan 
Congress Against A- and H-Bombs 
(Gensuikin) 
60,000 
9-Oct-11 Shibuya Minoru Ide 600 
27-Oct-11 METI  200 
6-Nov-11 Kichijoji  700 
11-Nov-11 METI   
14-Jan-12 Yokohama MCAN 300 
10-Mar-12 Hibiya Park MCAN 9,000 
11-Mar-12 Hibiya Park MCAN 30,000 
29-Mar-12 Prime Minister's 
Office 
MCAN 300 
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15-Jun-12 Prime Minister's 
Office 
MCAN 12,000 
22-Jun-12 Prime Minister's 
Office 
MCAN 45,000 
29-Jun-12 Prime Minister's 
Office 
MCAN 200,000 
6-Jul-12 Prime Minister's 
Office 
MCAN 150,000 
13-Jul-12 Prime Minister's 
Office 
MCAN 10,000 
16-Jul-12 Prime Minister's 
Office 
MCAN 170,000 
20-Jul-12 Prime Minister's 
Office 
MCAN 90,000 
29-Jul-12 Nagatacho MCAN 200,000 
3-Aug-12 Prime Minister's 
Office 
MCAN 3,000 
26-Aug-12 Shibuya  500 
13-Oct-12 Hibiya Park  6,500 
27-Oct-12 Nagoya  300 
28-Oct-12 Tokyo ` 100 
11-Nov-12 Prime Minister's 
Office 
MCAN 7,000 
15-Dec-12 Hibiya Park  1,000 
22-Dec-12 Prime Minister's 
Office 
MCAN 1,000 
22-Feb-13 Prime Minister's 
Office 
MCAN 3,000 
1-Mar-13 Prime Minister's 
Office 
MCAN 200 
9-Mar-13 Tokyo  13,000 
10-Mar-13 Hibiya Park MCAN 40,000 
15-Mar-13 Prime Minister's 
Office 
MCAN 3,000 
22-Mar-13 Prime Minister's 
Office 
MCAN 300 
29-Mar-13 Prime Minister's 
Office 
MCAN 6,000 
18-May-13 Shinjuku Fukushima evacuation trial team 400 
2-Jun-13 Diet Building MCAN and National Conference on 
Abolishing Nuclear Power Plants 
(Genpatsu wo Nakusu Zenkoku 
Renrakukai) 
85,000 
8-Jun-13 Diet Building  60,000 
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8-Jul-13 Roppongi, outside the 
Nuclear Regulation 
Authority 
 80 
Sources: "Anti-Nuclear Power Plants Super Huge Demo." TimeOut Tokyo, 10 April 2011; "東
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Join Anti-Nuclear Rally in Tokyo." Straits Times, 26 August 2012; "Nobel Laureate Oe 
Leads Protest of Oma Nuclear Plant." The Asahi Shimbun, 14 October 2012; "Antinuclear 
Rallies an Eye-Opener for University Students." The Japan Times, 3 November 2012; 
"Pumpkins and Zombies: Halloween around the Globe." Yahoo News, 30 October 2012; 
"Big Anti-Nuclear Protest Held near Diet Building in Tokyo." The Asahi Shimbun, 12 
November 2012; Nagata, Kazuaki. "Tokyo Rally Seeks to Keep Alive Quest to End 
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Building." The Mainichi, 3 June 2013; "Civic Groups Protest against Restarting Nuclear 
Reactors." The Mainichi, 8 July 2013. 
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Figure 3: Number of participants in the Japanese antinuclear movement 
Sources:  See Table 1 sources 
 
There are two points – concerning protest numbers and sources – that are important to consider 
when examining Table 1.  First, the larger demonstrations generated a wide range of attendance 
estimates.  The protest organizers typically estimated higher numbers than the police.  One 
journalist explains that police figures are lower because “[the policy] start counting at the 
beginning of a rally but neglect to take into account subsequent crowd swell.”57  Given the range 
of numbers, I choose to use organizers’ numbers in constructing Table 1 and Figure 3 to keep the 
source of the estimates consistent with those of the early demonstrations.  Due to the initial lack 
of police presence at the early events, organizers were the main source of those numbers.  
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Second, apart from the mass demonstrations in April and September 2011, major Japanese news 
outlets did not uniformly or consistently cover the protest rallies.  It was not until the large June 
2012 protests that nearly all the major news agencies and TV networks showed up to provide 
coverage; even then, Yomiuri Shimbun, one of five national newspapers in Japan, passed on the 
story.  Moreover, after the peak of the mobilization in June and July 2012, if news reports 
continued to cover the weekly protests, they sometimes referred to the large June and July 2012 
numbers without providing numbers for protests in August 2012 onward.  This suggests that the 
subsequent demonstrations did not draw the same number of people.58  Organizers corroborate 
this drop in numbers; they estimate that the August 2012 weekly protests drew about 90,000 
people but fell to around 20,000-35,000 people by October that same year.59   
Despite the wide range of numbers and spotty media coverage, one thing is clear: mass 
protests against nuclear power did not begin until June 2012, fifteen months after 3.11, which is 
a puzzle given that movements following Three Mile Island and Chernobyl did not see such 
delays.  Although the 26 April 2011 and 19 September 2011 events drew large crowds, they were 
isolated events, not followed up by consistent action from an organized actor.  In fact, one of the 
organizers of the April 2011 rallies, Hajime Matsumoto, expressed to Kyodo News his 
amazement at the 15,000-person turnout despite the lack of mobilization; he said, “It’s epoch-
making that so many people gathered without being mobilized by a large organization. [The 
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59 "首都圏反原発連合／近況報告及び今後の展開についての記者会見," Independent Web 
Journal, 19 October 2012 (http://iwj.co.jp/wj/open/archives/36366). 
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protest had] become powerful because we joined hands over the Internet.”60  As Table 1 reflects, 
smaller rallies continued to be held sporadically in 2011 and early 2012, though there was no 
central organizer, and they were “individually planned.”61  The Amateur’s Riot (a recycle shop), 
E-shift (a new group formed after 3.11), and Minoru Ide (a 31-year old interior decorator and 
punk band hobbyist) were some of the groups and individuals responsible for these events.  The 
fact that the early protests had a range of uncoordinated organizers indicates that the antinuclear 
movement had not yet mobilized.  It was not until March 2012 that Metropolitan Coalition 
Against Nukes (MCAN), a newly formed umbrella organization for antinuclear groups and 
individuals, began to organize weekly rallies outside the Prime Minister’s office.  As Figure 3 
shows, the peak of these protest occurred around June and July of 2012 when MCAN was finally 
able to draw large crowds to its rallies.  This peak came about 15 months later than the peaks of 
the Three Mile Island and Chernobyl protests.  Why was there a delay in the Japanese case?  
Was the 3.11 disaster perhaps not as terrible as other nuclear accidents? 
 
2.2 – Delay is Unexplained by Grievance  
To answer these questions, I investigate if there was insufficient grievance in Japan to 
spur mobilization of sustained mass protests, thus explaining the 15-month delay.  The evidence 
I find in this section indicates that there were high levels of objective grievance (environmental 
and economic costs) and subjective grievance (fear of radiation and uncertainty about the future, 
distrust in government, and disapproval of government policy) resulting from the Fukushima 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60 "17,500 Rally against Nuke Plants," The Japan Times, 11 April 2011 
(http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2011/04/11/national/17500-rally-against-nuke-plants/#.UbjPsfbEqtY). 
 
61 Keiichi Satoh, "What Should the Public Know?: Japanese Media Coverage on the Antinuclear 
Movement in Tokyo between March 11 and November 30, 2011," Disaster, Infrastructure and Society: 
Learning from the 2011 Earthquake in Japan, no. 2 (2012): 37. 
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nuclear plant meltdown.  In addition to being significant in length, Japan’s delay in mobilization 
was unexpected based on grievance levels.  As such, grievance theory is a poor fit for 
understanding the delayed mobilization of the Japanese antinuclear movement.  
 
2.2.1 – High Objective Grievance 
Objective grievance was high after the disaster.  Out of the three disasters (earthquake, 
tsunami, and nuclear disaster), the meltdown of Fukushima Daiichi power plant reactors is "the 
event with the most long term consequences."62  The nuclear explosion and resulting radiation 
leaks had costly environmental and economic consequences for Japan. 
First, the severity of the environmental problems resulting from Fukushima is reflected 
by the rating it achieved on the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)’s International 
Nuclear and Radiological Event Scale (INES) as well as reports of radioactive material released. 
Japan’s Nuclear Industrial and Safety Agency (NISA) originally rated Fukushima as an INES 
Level 3 (“serious incident”) disaster on March 11, raised it to Level 4 (“accident with local 
consequences”) on March 12, and then raised it once more to Level 7 (“major accident”) on 
April 12.  These changes were made due to “the impact of the cumulative effects from the 
continuing leaks of radioactive water and the widespread health and environmental effects.”63  
According to the IAEA, a Level 7 disaster is the highest, most dangerous level achievable by a 
nuclear accident; it involves a “major release of radioactive material with widespread health and 
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environmental effects requiring implementation of planned and extended countermeasures.”64  
The fact that only two nuclear accidents in history – Chernobyl and Fukushima – have ever 
received a Level 7 rating demonstrates that the Fukushima 3.11 nuclear meltdown was indeed an 
incident of high objective grievance.  
To put Fukushima’s radioactive fallout into perspective, the Three Mile Island was a 
Level 5 incident, and Chernobyl was Level 7.  According to Muller, “the meltdown at 
Fukushima led to a huge release of radioactivity—much greater than had happened in the prior 
U.S. nuclear reactor accident at Three Mile Island in 1979.”65  Comparing Fukushima to 
Chernobyl is “complicated due to the fact that a number of varieties of radiation have been 
released, and while one or several forms of radiation may be lower than Chernobyl, others may 
be higher.”66  Reports show that iodine 131, cesium 134 and 137, strontium and plutonium were 
leaked into the water, soil, and atmosphere in Fukushima.67  In June, NISA estimated that the 
release of radiation into the atmosphere in the first week may have been double what was 
previously estimated.  As of September 2011, they estimated that 770,000 terabecquerels were 
released.68  Two and a half years after the accident, as of 6 August 2013, Fukushima nuclear 
plant's groundwater contaminated with strontium, cesium, and tritium continues to leak into the 
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Pacific Ocean.69  An official at TEPCO suggested that on the whole, “the [Fukushima] situation 
could be worse than Chernobyl.”70   
Second, regarding economic losses, with three reactors failed, "Japan currently holds the 
unenviable record of the most costly man-made disaster in recorded history.71  TEPCO estimates 
that cleanup could cost $125 billion.72  For comparison, the Three Mile Island accident required 
“laborious cleanup, in which about 150 tons of contaminated materials were shipped to Idaho 
National Laboratory for storage, [taking] 14 years and [costing] nearly $1 billion.”73  As for 
Chernobyl, “precise costs have been impossible to calculate…because of policies in place at the 
time of the explosion and the inflation and economic disruptions that followed the break-up of 
the Soviet Union.”74  However, the IAEA estimates that Chernobyl’s economic costs have been 
several hundred billions of dollars:   
A variety of estimates from the 1990s placed the costs over two decades at 
hundreds of billions of dollars. These costs included direct damage, expenditures 
related to recovery and mitigation, resettlement of people, social protection and 
health care for the affected population, research on environment, health and the 
production of clean food, radiation monitoring, as well as indirect losses due to 	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removing agricultural lands and forests from use and the closing of agriculture 
and industrial facilities, and such additional costs as cancellation of the nuclear 
power program in Belarus and the additional costs of energy from the loss of 
power from Chernobyl. The costs have created a huge drain on the budgets of the 
three countries involved.75 
 
It may be still too early to know the full cost of Fukushima, but estimates of costs for immediate 
costs alone indicate that Fukushima’s objective grievance in the form of economic loss will be 
greater than the Three Mile Island’s and comparable to Chernobyl’s.  
Adding further economic costs to Japan, agricultural and fishing businesses were 
disrupted and suffered losses “estimated to be well over $1 billion” because of the nuclear 
crisis.76  Although the Ministry of Health, Labor, and Welfare’s (MHLW) tested 120,371 
samples of food for radiation levels and found only 1102 (less than 1%) of the samples to be 
concerning, they exercised caution and banned certain food products from Japanese and foreign 
markets.77  For example, produce, milk, and fish from Fukushima were found to contain levels of 
iodine-131 that exceeded government standards, and were thereby removed from the market.78  
Prior to 3.11, Fukushima was “the fourth largest producer of vegetables and rice in Japan” 
(accounting for 2% of the nation’s GDP), and fishing was “a primary industry.”79  In a second 
example, Aomori Prefecture’s apple growers were not able to export more than one ton of their 
products after the disaster.  Given that they “[produce] 90 percent of apples in Japan [and] 	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comprise 70 percent of Japan’s total fruit exports,” this was an economically painful 
development.80  In a third example, the cattle farming industry suffered economically from 
radiation contamination.  In July 2011, Aeon, Japan’s second largest retailer, discovered that the 
meat it had sold came from cattle that ate nuclear-contaminated feed.81  As a result, all beef 
shipments from areas near Fukushima were banned.82 
By June 2011, the MHLW’s list of food products that exceeded their safety limits was 
almost 350 items long and included products from eight prefectures, not just Fukushima.  Some 
scholars wonder if these high economic losses resulted more from government decisions than 
from radiation levels.  For instance, Brumfiel and Yuyuno argue that the Japanese government’s 
decision to set conservative radiation-dose-limits exacerbated the damages to the Fukushima 
economy.83  They find fault with MHLW’s decision “to lower the safe level for caesium in 
vegetables, grain and other foods from 500 becquerels per kilogram (Bqkg−1) to 100 
Bqkg−1 [even though] food with radioactivity lower than 500 Bqkg−1 is not harmful to human 
health.”84  Prohibiting crops containing more than 100 Bqkg−1of caesium imposes what Brumfiel 
and Yuyuno describe as “excessively stringent safety measures [that] could hinder not only the 
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recovery of the region's agriculture, but also the collection of scientific data.”85  Regardless of 
whether the Japanese government should shoulder the blame for the agricultural losses, one 
gathers that the losses were indeed high.     
 
2.2.2 – High Subjective Grievance 
The meltdown of Fukushima’s nuclear plants caused not only radiation spillage from the 
plant site, but also a nationwide shattering of the belief that nuclear power was clean, safe, and 
cheap.  After the disaster, fear of radiation and uncertainty about the future were pervasive.  
Additionally, growing subjective grievances in the form of distrust in the government and 
disapproval of the government’s nuclear energy policy were reflected in public opinion polls.   
First, fear of radiation and uncertainty about the future were serious public health 
concerns after 3.11.  A Pew Research Center report shows that in spring of 2011, a majority 
(59%) of Japanese surveyed was “worried about radiation risks to their families.”86  The same 
report shows that “fully 76% of Japanese believe produce from the Fukushima area is not safe” 
despite repeated assurances from the government and the scientific community.87  Satoshi 
Takahashi, a leading clinical psychologist in Japan predicted that “the mental fallout of the 
Fukushima meltdown will be worse than the physical impact.”88  Unlike post-traumatic stress 
prompted by the earthquake, “radiation [fear] creates a slow, creeping, invisible pressure that can 	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lead to prolonged depression.”89  The Fukushima Health Management Survey assessed the health 
of the 210,000 evacuees and found that “15% of adults showed signs of extreme stress, five 
times the normal rate, and one in five showed signs of mental trauma — a rate similar to that in 
first responders to the attacks of 11 September 2001 in the United States. A survey of children, 
filled out by their parents, showed stress levels about double the Japanese average.”90  According 
to Brumfiel, for those living near the disaster site, mental health problems were far more 
damaging than radiation itself:  
In the immediate aftermath of the nuclear accident, public-health experts worried 
about the possible risk from radiation. Subsequent analyses have shown that the 
prompt, if frantic, evacuation of areas around the reactors probably limited the 
public’s exposure to a relatively safe level… But uncertainty, isolation and fears 
about radioactivity’s invisible threat are jeopardizing the mental health of the 
210,000 residents who fled from the nuclear disaster.91 
 
In addition to radiation fears, uncertainty about the future was also mentally taxing.  The 
residents who fled Fukushima were uncertain they would ever return.  Although they received 
about $11,800 per household of immediate living expenses, the evacuees expressed that the 
amount was completely inadequate.92  Uncertainty also afflicted the people working in the 
agricultural and fishing industries.  Farmers and fishermen “were adamant that their industries 
and livelihoods had been ruined and that their businesses would never be able to recover because 
Japanese and foreign consumers would no longer trust their brands.”93  They were also “very 
concerned that the ongoing crisis at Fukushima would make a lasting impression on consumers 	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and, even if radioactive levels in foods were well below the standard set by government, 
confidence in Japanese food exports would quickly deteriorate.”94  These feelings of fear and 
uncertainty felt by Fukushima evacuees as well as those working in the agricultural and fishing 
sector, though subjective, were real consequences of the Fukushima nuclear disaster. 
 Second, a nationwide distrust in government grew after 3.11.  Data from the 2012 
Edelman Trust Barometer shows that Japan’s “trust in government” fell from 51% to 25%.  The 
level of trust in civil servants fell even more dramatically from 63% to 8% after 3.11.  Not 
surprisingly, the level of trust in the energy industry fell from 75% to 29%, making the once 
most trusted industry the least trusted.95  The loss of trust in these institutions can be explained 
by how the government handled the nuclear disaster in Fukushima.  Immediately following the 
accident at the Fukushima Daiichi plant, TEPCO and government officials assured the Japanese 
public that the “situation was under control, and that the power plants posed no risk to the 
public.”96  However, they very quickly revised the statement “to say that there could be health 
risks within a 12 mile evacuation zone, but that there was little or no health danger outside this 
zone.”97  Over the course of the following months, this statement as well as the INES rating 
would be corrected time and time again.  As a result, instead of reassuring the public, this 
method of cautious-assessment-then-revision “led to an erosion of public confidence in the 
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government’s ability to be truthful and honest about nuclear power.”98  A May 2011 poll 
“showed that more than eighty per cent of the population did not believe the government’s 
information about the nuclear crisis.”99  Studying trust levels after 3.11, Hommerich corroborates 
these findings; she concludes that the government’s management of relevant disaster information 
– the holding back of worst-case scenario reports, the upgrade to a Level 7 disaster, the three 
month delay of the release of radiation-spread projections from the System for Prediction of 
Environmental Emergency Dose Information (SPEEDI) – undermined trust in the Japanese 
national government.100  
Third, public opinion polls showed a decline in support for the government’s nuclear 
energy over time.  Figure 4 summarizes poll data gathered by Japanese mass media from April to 
October 2011. 
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Figure 4:  Surveying Public Opinion on the Future of Nuclear Power in Japn 
Source:   "Public Opinion Survey by Japanese Mass Media." Japan Atomic Industrial Forum, 
2011.  
 
It is clear from Figure 4 that in a little over half a year after the 3.11 disaster, the majority of the 
Japanese public switched from supporting nuclear power to opposing it.  A survey conducted by 
the Pew Research Center report corroborates this trend: by the time the last nuclear power station 
went offline in early 2012, 70% of Japanese said that Japan “should reduce its reliance on 
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nuclear energy.”101  This lends support to the claim that subjective grievance was high after the 
disaster. 
 
Conclusion 
In this section, I have argued that the 15-month delay in mobilization the Japanese 
antinuclear movement experienced was significant given comparable cases and unexpected given 
the high levels of objective and subjective grievance.  First, a historical analysis showed that 
nuclear accidents at Three Mile Island and Chernobyl prompted mass mobilization immediately 
or otherwise within the first few months of the disasters.  Likewise, a comparative analysis after 
Fukushima’s 3.11 disaster showed that European countries, such as Germany, rallied into mass 
protests immediately.  In contrast, Japan – which experienced the bulk of the environmental and 
economic costs (objective grievance) as well as the fear, uncertainty, and negative public 
attitudes towards government and nuclear energy (subjective grievances) – did not mobilize until 
fifteen months later.  These findings suggest that grievance is not the most relevant factor for 
understanding post-3.11 protest mobilization in Japan.   
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Section 3 
Resources 
According to Kitschelt, "if movements can appeal to widely shared norms, collect 
adequate information about the nature of the grievance against which they protest and raise the 
money to disseminate their ideas and information, the chances of a broad mobilization 
increase."102  This statement sums up the internal capacities-focused theory that resource 
availability encourages collective action mobilization.  It also hones in on three kinds of 
resources that affect mobilization: 1) cultural resources that make a movement more appealing; 
2) moral resources that lend attention and legitimacy to a movement’s cause; and 3) financial 
resources that enable a movement to produce and disseminate information.  In this section, I test 
whether the early post-3.11 antinuclear movement experienced a limitation of resources, which if 
it existed, would help to explain why the antinuclear movement took as long as fifteen months to 
mobilize.  I look specifically for evidence concerning moral resources in the form of media 
attention, cultural resources in the form of activist know-how, and material resources in the form 
of money.  I find that with the exception of moral resources, which was partially lacking, the 
antinuclear protest movement did not appear to experience resource limitations during the 
months following the disaster, thereby showing that the resource-dependent hypothesis is not 
supported.   
 
3.1 – Partial Lack of Media Attention  
The antinuclear movement partially lacked moral resources in the form of mass media 
attention.  Media attention is a valuable moral resource because it allows the public to receive 	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information about ongoing grievances and provides movements with space to publicize their 
messages along with recognition that their actions are important and worth covering.103  
Essentially, media attention provides a movement with legitimacy – the essential moral resource 
– even if the news station or newspaper does not agree with a movement’s aims.  Mazur  
explains how media attention functions as a moral resource: “Increased reporting [makes] topics 
salient, placing them on the 'public agenda,' so that the audience increasingly thinks and talks 
about them, even if they do not adopt the attitudes of the journalists on these topics."104  Because 
gaining media spotlight brings a cause to the center of public consciousness, grassroots 
movements in particular find it useful for mobilization; without it, “a demonstration…is a 
nonevent, unlikely to have any positive inﬂuence on mobilizing followers or inﬂuencing the 
target.”105  Additionally, media attention can raise the status of activists and protest leaders, 
offering moral resource in the form of validation especially when no material benefits are 
guaranteed.106 Furthermore, not only does mass media bring attention and legitimacy to a 
movement and its leaders, it also positively correlates with civil participation.107  Scholars such 
as Bennett and Kottasz, Massey, Waters and Tindall demonstrate a positive correlation between 
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news coverage of a particular disaster and increased donations to disaster relief funds.108  Other 
studies show that coverage of an event such as a nuclear accident positively correlates with 
public awareness of nuclear issues; “mass media can enhance general public concern about 
global environmental problems.”109  In fact, according to Mazur, "the organs of mass 
communication seem to be especially potent in bringing topics of environmental hazard to the 
attention of the audience.”110 
Given the benefits that come with media attention, a lack of media coverage of the 
nuclear situation, early antinuclear protests, or both, offers one possible explanation of why 
mobilization of the Japan post-3.11 antinuclear movement was delayed.  While analysis of 
newspapers and TV reports shows that Japanese sources devoted a smaller percentage of 
disaster-related stories to the nuclear incident and presented less dramatic coverage than 
international news sources did, there is no evidence to suggest Japanese mass media provided 
limited coverage of the nuclear situation in absolute terms.   
I highlight two studies that discuss differences between Japanese and foreign news 
coverage on the nuclear situation.  First, a study conducted by Tkach-Kawasaki compares three 
Japanese newspapers (Asahi, Mainichi, and Yomiuri) to two foreign newspapers (CNN 
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International and CNN U.S).111  Table 2 accounts for all the disaster-related news reported on the 
top page of the Asahi, Mainichi, Yomiuri, CNN International and CNN U.S. websites during 
March 2011.  The news reports are separated by topic (earthquake/tsunami, nuclear situation, 
lifeline, and aid/relief), with numbers outside the parentheses tallying the absolute number of 
reports per topic, and numbers inside the parentheses calculating the percentage each topic 
received out of the total number of disaster-related reports from a particular news source. 
Table 2 
Categorization of disaster-related news items on website top page 
                  Website 
Topic 
Asahi N 
(%) 
Mainichi N 
(%) 
Yomiuri N 
(%) 
CNN Int'l N 
(%) 
CNN U.S. N 
(%) 
Earthquake/tsunami      
--March 17 31 (37.8) 19 (27.5) 21 (24.7)  8 (33.3)  6 (35.3) 
--March 24 35 (43.2) 13 (22.4) 30 (37.0)  7 (50.0)  6 (33.3) 
--March 31 38 (54.3) 12 (25.0) 37 (46.3)  5 (55.6)  4 (66.7) 
Nuclear situation      
--March 17 26 (31.7) 21 (30.4) 25 (29.4) 15 (62.5)  9 (52.9) 
--March 24 20 (24.7) 13 (22.4) 21 (25.9)  5 (35.7) 11 (61.1) 
--March 31  7 (10.0)  6 (12.5) 21 (26.3)  4 (44.4)  2 (33.3) 
Lifeline      
--March 17 24 (29.3) 25 (36.2) 34 (40.0)  0 (0.0)  0 (0.0) 
--March 24 17 (21.0) 28 (48.3) 26 (32.1)  0 (0.0)  0 (0.0) 
--March 31 16 (22.9) 26 (54.2) 12 (15.0)  0 (0.0)  0 (0.0) 
Aid/Relief      
--March 17  1 (1.2)  4 (5.8)  5 (5.59)  1 (4.2)  2 (11.8) 
--March 24  9 (8.6)  4 (6.9)  4 (4.9)  2 (14.3)  1 (5.6) 
--March 31  9 (12.9)  4 (8.3) 10 (12.5)  0 (0.0)  0 (0.0) 
Total      
--March 17      82       69        85        24        17 
--March 24      81       58        81        14        18 
--March 31      70       48        80         9         6 
Source: Tkach-Kawasaki, Leslie M. "March 11, 2011 Online: Comparing Japanese Newspaper 
Websites and International News Websites," 116 
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Based on this data, Tkach-Kawasaki concludes that in the first month after the disaster, Japanese 
newspapers devoted a smaller percentage of their disaster-related coverage to the nuclear 
situation than international news sources did.112  However, looking only at the two CNN columns, 
I suspect that this is not necessarily because Japanese sources downplayed the nuclear situation 
but more because both CNN sources had less to say about the earthquake/tsunami and nothing to 
say about lifeline information.  As a result, their percentages of disaster-related news devoted to 
the nuclear situation turned out to be high.  Additionally, looking at the absolute number of 
nuclear-related reports for all the newspapers suggests a different trend; the figures show that 
throughout March 2011, all three Japanese newspapers published more reports on the nuclear 
situation than CNN International and CNN U.S. did.   
Second, a study by Imtihani and Yanai compares NHK’s (Japanese public television) 
coverage to the BBC World’s.  Imtihani and Yanai find that NHK spent a smaller number of 
hours highlighting the nuclear situation than the BBC did.113  While “NHK kept focusing on the 
handling of the earthquake and tsunami…BBC dug more deeply into the information on what 
was happening with the nuclear plant after the tsunami hit that caused a failure in the reactor 
cooling system.”114  Imtihani and Yanai also argue that a look at the content of NHK broadcasts 
shows a tendency to downplay the nuclear situation.  First, its selection of sources and 
commentators came mostly from official government statements.  Second, it used only images 
(less alarming), not videos (more alarming), to show the first explosion of the Fukushima nuclear 
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plant.  Third, it framed its reports in a manner favorable to the government and TEPCO.  For 
example, it framed the flushing of water into the reactors as an “epic story of Japanese defense 
forces fighting the great impact of a disaster,” while the BBC framed it as a “futile action and an 
expression of frustration because there was no other action that could be taken at that time.”115  
While Imtihani and Yanai’s study raises an important point about Japanese and foreign 
journalists framing the nuclear situation differently, it is difficult to determine if NHK 
deemphasized the severity of the nuclear disaster or if the BBC overemphasized it.  The answer 
to this question seems to depend on who one asks. 
Some claim that the Japanese news sources downplayed the unfolding nuclear situation 
due to its pro-nuclear ties.  For example, Liscutin describes the Japanese media as the “fifth 
[pillar] of the atomic village [that] supported the official strategy of downplaying the nuclear 
disaster thereby showing themselves at the time, as little more than the mouthpiece of the 
government and TEPCO.”116  This is consistent with the finding that countries highly dependent 
on nuclear energy control media reports in order to mitigate public opposition.117  In their book 
Hōdō saigai ‘gempatsu-hen’ (Journalism-Made Disaster: The Nuclear Power Chapter) Uesugi 
Takashi and Ugaya Hiromichi accuse the Japanese media for suspending investigative 
journalism near the meltdown and “[promulgating] the government’s line that the risk of 
radiation escaping from the reactors and thus the risk of irradiation to the population of 
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Fukushima and the Tohoku and Kanto areas were ‘minimal.’”118  They charge the Japanese 
media with “effectively [deserting] the population they were supposed to inform.”119 
In contrast, others believe that Japanese journalists provided careful but fair coverage, 
while foreign journalists overdramatized the nuclear situation.  In an article published by the 
Japanese-language version of Newsweek, Yamada and Yokota criticized foreign journalists for 
showing a lack of composure after the disaster and sparking unnecessary fears through their 
reporting.120  One example they cite involves CNN’s Anderson Cooper.  Throughout Cooper’s 
on-site broadcast, he showed concern about how far away he was from the Fukushima reactors 
and asked questions about which way the wind was blowing.  Even when he was stationed 100 
kilometers away, he asked if he should move to a more distant location.   According to Yamada 
and Yokota, Cooper made little attempt to calmly gather facts about the nuclear situation, and in 
so doing sparked needless fears.121  Why might foreign media overdramatize the nuclear 
situation?  Tkach-Kawasaki speculates that while the Japanese media may have felt an “intrinsic 
sense of responsibility about managing the crisis and not sparking hysteria,” foreign news did not 
have the same constraint.122  In an interview with the Nikkei Shimbun, Yuri Okina, the Executive 
Vice President of the National Institute for Research Advancement, said that the reason for 
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sensationalist foreign reporting could be due to the fact that government and TEPCO officials 
made little effort to engage with foreign media: 
Neither the government nor TEPCO did enough to communicate the facts of the 
situation in English. As a result, foreign journalists began to get the idea that 
"Japan is hiding something" or "they aren't telling us the truth" which contributed 
to coverage that heightened anxieties…. There is an urgent need to improve the 
ability of Japan's civilian and government agencies to communicate objective 
facts about the situation to those abroad. The government held daily press 
conferences led by Chief Cabinet Secretary [Edano] for the domestic audience, 
but they also need to directly engage the foreign media with press conferences 
that disseminate proper information in other languages.123 
 
Regardless of which view one subscribes to, the conclusion that one can draw is that 
Japanese and foreign media covered the nuclear situation differently.  All things 
considered, the evidence suggests that local mass media did cover the nuclear situation, 
though coverage may have been more careful, optimistic, or a smaller percentage of the 
overall disaster-related coverage. 
 While there is a debate about whether or not Japanese mass media provided limited 
coverage of the nuclear situation in Fukushima, the claim that they provided sporadic and 
minimal coverage on the early protest demonstrations is less disputed.  According to Satoh, 
“most newspapers provided minimal coverage based only on what each of the newspaper’s 
reporters just happened to know.”124  Interestingly, in contrast, each of the major Japanese 
newspapers – Japan Times, Yomiuri, Mainichi, Nikkei, and Asahi – reported on (and for some, 
featured) the 26 March 2011 demonstrations that took place in Germany.125  Such unevenness of 
coverage suggests that Japanese newspapers tended to overlook the growing local antinuclear 	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protests.  In fact, the 11 June 2011 rally was the first post-Fukushima protest event in Japan that 
all five newspapers mentioned.126  However, in the months following June 2011, the coverage of 
protests continued to be less than expected, and at times, alarmingly absent.  For example, on 19 
September 2011, 60,000 people demonstrated in Meiji Park in central Tokyo, forming the largest 
group of protesters found in Japan in at least four decades.  This demonstration was not 
mentioned in the 7:00pm national news that night even though the protest ended its march right 
across the street from the NHK headquarters.127  Kingston commented on this omission by 
saying, “It is this sort of media “unhappening” that raises alarms about the power it has over 
framing public discourse, because…the domestic mainstream media were more lapdog than 
watchdog in covering the nuclear crisis.”128  By providing little coverage on the antinuclear 
demonstrations, the Japanese press delegitimized concerns about nuclear-related issues and 
dismissed nuclear opposition as something outside of the mainstream discourse on Fukushima.  
In this way, the lack of media attention concerning the early protest can be seen as a lack of 
moral resources made available to the Japanese antinuclear movement. 
 
3.2 – Available Cultural Resources 
The antinuclear movement had cultural resources at its disposal to make its activities 
culturally appealing.  Cultural resources are defined as “practical mastery of political activism 
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[depending] on campaign routines, intuition and an acquired 'common sense.'”129  This activism 
“know-how” informs protest culture by providing “sensitivity to the complex meanings of words, 
symbols, persons, actions, places and times.”130  Although few people in the early post-3.11 
demonstrations had prior experience with antinuclear activism specifically, they showed aptitude 
for making the protest movement appealing through historical tie-ins, celebrity spokespersons, 
friendly styles of protest, and strategically designed mascots.   
First, an important image evoked by the antinuclear movement involved connecting the 
Fukushima nuclear reactor meltdowns to the Hiroshima and Nagasaki atomic bombings.  This 
linkage was clearly made by Kenzaburo Oe, whose leadership at antinuclear rallies helped to 
“[connect] the people of Tohoku to the victims of the atomic bombings in Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki.”131  In a March 2011 New Yorker article, Oe wrote that he hoped “the accident at the 
Fukushima facility [would] allow the Japanese to reconnect with the victims of Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki, to recognize the danger of nuclear power, and to put an end to the illusion of the 
efficacy of deterrence that is advocated by nuclear powers.”132  He expressed the same purpose 
in his rally speeches by announcing that he was “going to fight against those who act as though 
Hiroshima, Nagasaki and Fukushima never happened.”133  Grouping these tragic events and their 
victims together allowed the antinuclear movement to tap into a victim-focused approach that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
129 Christian Lahusen, The Rhetoric of Moral Protest: Public Campaigns, Celebrity Endorsement, 
and Political Mobilization  (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1996), 120. 
 
130 Edwards and McCarthy, "Resources and Social Movement Mobilization," 126. 
 
131 Samuels, 3.11: Disaster and Change in Japan: 132. 
 
132 Kenzaburo Oe, "History Repeats," The New Yorker, 28 March 2011 
(http://www.newyorker.com/talk/2011/03/28/110328ta_talk_oe). 
 
133 "Thousands Gather for Tokyo Anti-Nuclear Protest 2 Yrs Post-Fukushima," RT, 9 March 2013 
(http://rt.com/news/japan-nuclear-protest-fukushima-038/). 
 
	  56	  
had historically been successful for the antipollution movement, but not the pre-3.11 antinuclear 
movement.134  By strategically tying in the devastation of Fukushima with Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki’s, the antinuclear movement demonstrated its ability to use history in a meaningful and 
compelling way.     
Second, a number of Japanese celebrities served as cultural resources for the antinuclear 
movement.  According to scholars such as Lahusen and Street, the availability of famous 
spokespersons can encourage mobilization of social movements by bringing attention to the 
movements’ causes.135  A celebrity endorsement is a resource powerful enough to “greatly 
increase public attention, generate media coverage, and open doors to policymakers and resource 
providers alike.”136  In fact, “celebrity endorsements are especially credible in cases...where the 
celebrity commands the details of the issue, evidences sincere and longstanding commitment, 
and donates his or her own time."137  There are several examples of committed celebrities who 
participated in the post-3.11 movement.  Nobel laureate Kenzaburo Oe, whom I previously 
mentioned, showed a longstanding, unwavering commitment to eliminating nuclear power and 
donated a significant amount of time to the rallies.  Ryuichi Sakamoto, a member of the 
groundbreaking Japanese technopop group Yellow Magic Orchestra (YMO) and a Grammy 
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Award-winning composer, frequently worked alongside Oe at the rallies soon after 3.11.138  
Later in July 2012, Sakamoto used his fame and connections within the music industry to 
organize No Nukes 2012, a rock concert to raise funds for Sayonara Genpatsu 1000 Man Nin 
Akushon (Citizens’ Committee for the 10 Million People’s Petition to say Goodbye to Nuclear 
Power Plants).139  This event allowed even more celebrities – “including pioneering electronic 
groups Kraftwerk and YMO as well as rock bands Asian Kung-Fu Generation, Acidman, and 
others” – to participate in the antinuclear movement.  Taro Yamamoto, a “popular actor, who had 
appeared in many films and television dramas, made a video for Operation Kodomotachi, a 
nonprofit organization supporting the evacuation of children from Fukushima; in it, he was 
bluntly critical of the government's setting of mandatory evacuation zones, which he claimed 
were too small and made so in order to save money.”140  Due to the controversy of his views, he 
left his talent agency in 2011 and eventually took his antinuclear message into politics.141  These 
examples of celebrity participation – and in some cases, leadership – is a testament to the 
strength of the antinuclear movement’s cultural resources.  
Third, another example of the antinuclear movement’s protest “know-how” is seen in the 
non-violent and friendly manner in which protests were held.  According to the New York Times, 
“rally organizers [went] to great lengths to project a friendly image in a generally conformist 
country where protesters of any kind are seen by many as fringe agitators at best and terrorists at 	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worst.”142  This negative perception of protesting was formed based on the “mass protests in the 
1960s and ’70s against a security treaty with the United States, during which rioters armed with 
pipes and makeshift gasoline bombs clashed with the police.”143  In contrast, the post-3.11 
demonstrations have been notably orderly with organizers issuing specific instructions “to 
cooperate with the local police and to go home at 8 p.m. on the dot.”144  Asahi Shimbun reports 
that protests have been both orderly and accessible: 
Protests throughout Japan have managed to create a peaceful, welcoming 
atmosphere that has helped to prevent the movement from fading away…Because 
the (protest) sites are nonviolent, anybody can join. The festival-like atmosphere 
created by the rhythm of the drums and the like also lowers the hurdles to 
engaging in a demonstration or protest.145 
 
By projecting an orderly and friendly style of protest, organizers had made their activities more 
appealing to the Japanese people. 
Fourth, in keeping with this friendly image and cleverly building on Japanese society’s 
appreciation for cartoon characters, the antinuclear movement created a mascot named Monju-
kun to criticize the government’s nuclear energy policy.146  Monju-kun presents an interesting 
contrast to Pluto-kun, who was a fictional character created by the Power Reactor and Nuclear 
Fuel Corporation (PNC) years ago to assure the public that nuclear energy was a safe choice.  
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Since early 2012, Monju-kun has made multiple appearances at antinuclear protests and has 
amassed a large Twitter following (102,786 to date).147  In addition, an anonymous author has 
written three “light-hearted” books under this cartoon character’s name to discuss the hazards of 
nuclear power.148  This use of Monju-kun strategically counters the claims of Pluto-kun and 
appeals to cartoon-character-loving Japan, demonstrating cultural savvy on the part of the 
antinuclear movement. 
To sum up, Hiroshima and Nagasaki connections, presence of celebrity spokespersons 
such as Kenzaburo Oe and Ryuichi Sakamoto, friendly protest manners, and creation of Monju-
kun show that the antinuclear had access to valuable cultural resources.  Such resources, in turn, 
should have made the movement more culturally acceptable and encouraged mobilization. 
  
3.3 – Available Monetary Resources 
Sufficient monetary resources were available to organizations with antinuclear aims.  
First, because an important part of the early antinuclear movement relied on disseminating 
information about the 3.11 nuclear situation, independent, alternative news organizations were 
needed to provide for full coverage of the issue.  Two examples of independent, Internet-based 
media organizations were Web Iwakami and OurPlanet-TV (OPT), both of which made efforts to 
raise funds for their online broadcasts.  
Web Iwakami broadcasted all government and TEPCO news conferences online, asked 
the tough questions that mainstream journalists avoided, and allowed viewers to participate in 
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and interact with their videos.  They expanded to nine live-streaming channels immediately after 
3.11 and then further increased their web presence to “a staggering 93 regional channels to cover 
events from the 47 prefectures of Japan.”149  In order to fund their work, they “[relied] entirely 
on donations of users and supporters, or income through workshops…symposia and publications 
as well as the work of volunteers.”150  According to Iwakami, network viewers have been very 
supportive in “[organizing] local lecture events, [joining] local protest movements, [travelling] to 
Tokyo for the September 19 rally [and] also actively [helping] to keep Web Iwakami financially 
afloat through donations.”151  Web Iwakami has also been able to lower its publicity costs by 
using Twitter; it has approximately 80,000 Twitter followers, who are able to get news alerts and 
share video links with their friends.152   
As for OPT, by November 2011, it had “[broadcasted] around 90 documentaries, 
interviews, press conferences as well as lectures on the Fukushima disaster and nuclear energy, 
of which around 40 videos [were] concerned with the consequences of nuclear disaster on 
children’s lives and health, and about 15 reports/interviews [concerned] the plight of the workers 
at Fukushima Daiichi.”153  Along with these videos, they created about 50 written news bulletins.  
To fund all of these projects, OPT raised money through membership fees and donations, which 
they collect directly through their website or online campaigns such as Indiegogo.154 	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In addition to these alternative news organizations, MCAN, another group highly 
important to the antinuclear movement, has managed to successfully raise money for its activities. 
MCAN released monthly financial reports of its protest events from March 2012 to August 2012, 
which I summarize in Table 3.  
 
Table 3 
Balance of MCAN’s weekly demonstrations in front of the Prime Minister’s Office, March 
2012-August 2012 
Month Revenue (through 
fundraising) 
Expenses Balance 
March 2012 0 ¥5,070 (¥5,070) 
April 2012 0 ¥15,580 (¥15,580) 
May 2012 ¥69,524 ¥19,070 ¥50,454 
June 2012 ¥994,180 ¥107,609 ¥886,571 
July 2012 ¥598,578 ¥327,771 ¥270,807 
August 2012 ¥1,179,043 ¥520,698 ¥658,345 
Source: "2012年3月～10月官邸前抗議収支報告." Metropolitan Coalition Against Nukes, 2012. 
 
 
Also worth noting in Table 4 is the amount of revenue single-handedly brought in by MCAN’s 
Tokyo Grand March’s held on the first anniversary of 3.11: 
 
Table 4: MCAN Individual Event Balance, 3/11/2012 Tokyo Grand March 
Individual Large 
Scale Event 
Revenue Expenses Balance 
3/11/2012 Tokyo 
Grand March 
¥526,528 ¥235,163 
 
¥291,365 
Source: "2012年3月11日3.11東京大行進会計報告書." Metropolitan Coalition Against Nukes, 
2012. 
 
There are two trends that I would like to highlight from MCAN’s financial reports of its protest 
events.  First, in Table 3, we see that in the months preceding mobilization (March, April, and 
May), MCAN’s revenue for the time period was greater than its expenses.  Although MCAN did 
not fundraise for its protests until May that year, it managed to cover its protest expenses. Second, 
we see that protest events did not require large amounts of money to put on.  Aside from printing 
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fliers or creating banners, protest organizers could hold these events on small budgets.  An entire 
month of MCAN’s protest expenses was less than US$200 before mobilization and less than 
US$5,000 during its peak period.  
The successful fundraising efforts of these groups, which were central to the pre-
mobilized antinuclear movement, suggest that limited availability of monetary resources was not 
a significant problem in the months following 3.11. 
 
Conclusion 
Because this section concentrated on the internal capacities of the antinuclear movement, 
one point that I did not discuss was competition from other causes for valuable resources.  The 
reality of the triple disaster meant that Japanese civil society was not focused solely on the 
nuclear situation.  News coverage of 3.11 was divided between the nuclear situation and 
earthquake and tsunami-related reports as well as lifeline, disaster, and aid information.  
Additionally, the triple disaster meant that the antinuclear groups were not the only ones 
gathering resources.  Disaster organizations made concerted efforts to encourage participation in 
relief work and raise money for the earthquake and tsunami-related devastation around the same 
time.  According to Yayoi Tanaka, the president of the Japan NPO Research Association, 
“aggregate number of people who took part in volunteer activities via referrals at volunteer 
centers in Iwate Prefecture (24 centers), Miyagi Prefecture (12 centers) and Fukushima 
Prefecture (28 centers) totaled 1.02 million as of May 2012.”155  Even members of the Japanese 
mafia, also known as yakuza, saw provided assistance as a culturally fitting endeavor.  When 
asked why they sent “twenty-five four-ton trucks filled with paper diapers, instant ramen, 	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batteries, flashlights, drinks, and the essentials of daily life to the Tohoku region, they said, 
“There are no yakuza or katagi (ordinary citizens) or gaijin (foreigners) in Japan right now. We 
are all Japanese. We all need to help each other.”156  In addition to cultural resources, disaster 
organizations also successfully raised monetary support.  There is data to show that people gave 
generously through direct donations to the victims (geinkin) and through disaster relief NPOs, 
NOGS, and other groups (shienkin).  Aid given to those directly affected by the disaster (geinkin) 
amounted to 316.8 billion yen by the end of May 2012 while donations made towards groups, 
organizations, local governments, and engaged NPOs/NGOS (shienkin) amounted to about 209.3 
billion yen by the end of February 2012.157  Indeed, the earthquake and tsunami disaster response 
after 3.11 was immediate, well-resourced, and a demonstration of the strength of Japanese civil 
society.  A reasonable question to ask is whether the vast amounts of resources devoted to 
earthquake and tsunami disaster relief diverted important resources away from the antinuclear 
movement, but I find no direct evidence to suggest that they did.  
Instead, I found that the antinuclear movement only partially lacked moral resources in 
the form of media coverage.  Japanese newspapers reported on the nuclear disaster, even if the 
coverage was a smaller percentage of total-disaster reports and more optimistic than international 
media.  However, they did provide limited coverage of the early protests resulting from 3.11.  
Furthermore, I found that the antinuclear movement showed it had the cultural and monetary 
resources needed to accomplish its aims.  By connecting Fukushima to Hiroshima and Nagasaki, 
highlighting participation of celebrity spokespersons, portraying a friendly style of protest, and 
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creating Monju-kun as an identifiable mascot, the nascent antinuclear movement showed that it 
had the know-how to grow its appeal.  Likewise, successful efforts by Web Iwakami, OPT, and 
MCAN to raise monetary resources allowed for the dissemination of information about the 
nuclear issue as well as the organization of protest activity.   
Therefore, the hypothesis that the antinuclear movement faced limited availability of 
resources, thus delaying mobilization, is only partially supported by the evidence presented.  The 
partial lack of moral resources offers support for the hypothesis, but the availability of both 
cultural and monetary resources should have encouraged mobilization. 
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Section 4 
Mobilization Structure and Strategy 
 In this second section on internal capacities, I examine how the types of early protesters 
as well as the mobilization strategies adopted by the movement promoted strong antinuclear 
sentiments and well-attended single protest events, but delayed sustained mobilization.  In the 
first part of this section, I argue that the early protesters were not long-time antinuclear true 
believers or activists (the type of protesters known to be more effective at mobilizing) but regular 
citizens gathered out of fear of radiation and still others who joined spontaneously.   Notably 
represented at the early protests were women and freeters whose motivations for demonstrating 
illustrate the preponderance of amateur protesters at the events and offers an explanation for the 
movement’s lack of sustained mass mobilization.  In the second part of this section, I explain 
how the use of Twitter and other social media platforms allowed movement organizers to 
speedily amass large numbers of regular citizens for single protest events, but proved to be a 
poor substitute for more traditional forms of mobilization, which were necessary in order to 
maintain a network for a centralized and sustained movement.   
 
4.1 – The Protesters 
As cited in the introductory section, protesters can be classified into four types:  
(1) true believers (2) activists (3) regular citizens gathered around a specific issue or goal; and 
(4) spontaneous protesters.  Based on findings by Passy and Giugni, we know that true believers 
and activists are more predisposed to protesting and more effective at mobilizing support.158  
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I argue that Japan’s delay in sustained mass mobilizations can be explained by the dearth 
of true believers and activists and the preponderance of the last two types of protesters, regular 
citizens gathered around a single issue and spontaneous protesters.  To build this argument, first, 
I explain how the first two types of protesters – true believers and activists – were 
underrepresented after the disaster due to a long-standing “nuclear blind spot” in Japanese civil 
society.  Second, I present evidence to suggest that women and freeters, whose active 
participation in the early movement were noted by various scholars and reporters, fell under the 
third and fourth categories (citizens organized around a single issue and spontaneous protesters).  
 
4.1.1 – Lack of Pre-existing Antinuclear True Believers and Activists 
Where were Japan’s antinuclear true believers and environmental activists?  The answer 
to this question lies in the fact that sustained activism against nuclear power – and more 
specifically, nuclear power plants – has historically been missing in Japan.  Even before 3.11, 
Japanese civil society had exhibited what Avenell calls a “nuclear blind spot.”159  The term 
“nuclear blind spot” refers to the fact that despite the great democratic upsurge of environmental 
activism in the 1960s when Japanese citizens “embraced…protest, litigation, public discussion, 
and political mobilization” concerning pollution issues, nuclear power has been continuously 
overlooked by the Japanese Pollution Research Committee and unsuccessfully targeted by 
activists as a single issue.160  The omission of nuclear safety issues from the Pollution Research 
Committee’s agenda up until the Fukushima accident is notable given that the committee had 
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uncovered corporate deception concerning nuclear power radiation at Minamata and Yokkaichi 
and were fully aware of antinuclear movements springing up in the United States and Western 
Europe.161  Furthermore, “by 2007, the utilities reported that there had been ninety-seven 
mishaps in nuclear power plants nationwide, including…the 1995 sodium leak at the Power 
Reactor and Nuclear Fuel Corporation’s (PNC’s) Monju [fast breeder reactor] and the twenty-
hour-long criticality accident in 1999.”162  With such developments indicating the potential 
dangers of nuclear power, one would expect to see a civic-led initiative for closer monitoring of 
radiation from nuclear plants and opposition towards the Japanese government’s strong push for 
nuclear energy. 
Instead, activism against nuclear power turned out to be ineffective, unfocused, and 
sporadic.  For example, after the 1986 Chernobyl accident, a group of citizens circulated a 
petition calling for a “nuclear-free law,” which collected about 3.3 million signatures in 1990 and 
1991.163  However, the petition never reached the Diet, and the efforts to oppose nuclear power 
were eventually abandoned.  According to Cavasin, “after that experience, the movement 
[focused] its attention on other issues, such as the environment, education, and social problems, 
sometimes partnering with nonprofits and NGOs.  While it has staged individual antinuclear 
protests...it has had little long-term effect on government policy."164  In another example, while a 
limited number of antinuclear true believers and environmental activists did organize in the form 	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of the Japan Congress against A- and H-Bombs (Genuikin) and the National Network against 
Nuclear Energy, these organizations “were not professional advocacy organizations with strong 
influence on policy-making, [and] when push came to shove, [they] were more strongly opposed 
to nuclear weapons than to nuclear power.”165  This unfocused opposition to nuclear power is 
reflected in several of the post-3.11 protests, in which protesters carried signs against both 
nuclear power and nuclear weapons.  This intertwining of issues reveals a lack of an existing 
bloc of true believers or activists that dealt singularly with opposing nuclear power plants.   
Several scholars note the dearth of sustained antinuclear activism, corroborating 
Avenell’s claim about Japan’s “nuclear blind spot.”  Hasegawa describes Japan as having had 
"weak antinuclear groups lacking resources."166  Comparing German and Japanese civil societies, 
McKean notes that “the intense opposition in Germany to nuclear power rather than other 
environmental threats…contrast with Japan.”167  Kawato, Pekkanen, and Tsujinaka mention that 
Japanese civil society groups “were not…successful in preventing problems in nuclear policy or 
the nuclear industry.”168  Studying activism after the Tokai Village disaster, Cavasin concludes 
that while interest in antinuclear activism increased slightly after the disaster, movements “still 
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remain fragmented, their long-term stability has not yet been demonstrated and no nationwide 
antinuclear group has as yet emerged."169  How did this “nuclear blind spot” arise?   
First, strategic and expensive government efforts to present nuclear power as a safe, or at 
least financially beneficial, option contributed to the lack of activism found in civil society.   
After the first oil crisis in 1973, the government worked hard to suppress grassroots antinuclear 
activity by reassuring its citizens about safety of nuclear fuel.170  Their efforts were largely 
successful, and “the antinuclear movement in Japan was relatively peripheral [because of] the 
deeply ingrained notion of nuclear power as ‘safe.’”171  The government also invested heavily in 
paying off local communities hosting the power plants; in fact, “Japan was the first country to 
offer governmental subsidies for nuclear facilities in the name of promoting local 
development.”172  As Kawato, Pekkanen, and Tsujinaka describe, “the state and electric power 
companies tried to preserve their freedom of action [by offering] large compensation packages to 
local communities that accepted nuclear plants.”173  For example, during the thirty-five years 
between 1974 and 2009, cities and towns in Fukui Prefecture (the host of 13 nuclear plants) 
“received more than 150 billion yen in subsidies from the central government, and the prefecture 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
169 Cavasin, "Citizen Activism and the Nuclear Industry in Japan: After the Tokai Disaster," 72. 
 
170 Samuels, 3.11: Disaster and Change in Japan: 113. 
 
171 David H. Slater, Keiko Nishimura, and Love Kindstrand, "Social Media in Disaster Japan," in 
Natural Disaster and Nuclear Crisis in Japan: Response and Recovery after Japan's 3/11, ed. Jeff 
Kingston, The Nissan Institute/Routledge Japanese Studies Series (New York: Taylor & Francis, 2012), 
107. 
 
172 Hasegawa, "A Comparative Study of Social Movements for a Post-Nuclear Energy Era in 
Japan and the USA," 71. 
 
173 Kawato, Pekkanen, and Tsujinaka, "Civil Society and the Triple Disasters: Revealed Strengths 
and Weaknesses," 81. 
 
	  70	  
received nearly 175 billion yen.”174  Furthermore, when the electric power companies “searched 
for sites to construct nuclear plants, they purposefully chose communities in which civil society 
was weak.”175  In an interview, Satoshi Kamata, a September 2011 protest organizer, made an 
interesting analogy to describe the government’s relationship to local communities that host 
nuclear plants: 
The nuclear industry is like the big bad wolf from the fairy tale [Little Red Riding 
Hood]. Grandma won’t open the door to let him in the house. But when she looks 
under it, she thinks it is not the wolf but her granddaughter. So she opens the door 
and the wolf eats her. The house is Japan, and grandma is the local 
communities.176  
 
After opening the door to nuclear power, local communities became highly dependent on nuclear 
plants for their economy.  Although government subsidies covered the costs of plant construction, 
they did not cover operations costs, thus local communities had to invite more plants to be 
constructed in order to generate enough income to operate the original plants.177  The result was 
a “nuclear power plant addiction” (genpatsu izon-shō).178  Concerted efforts by the government 
to promote nuclear energy – by presenting it as safe, offering large financial pay-offs to host 
communities, targeting communities with already weak civil societies, and sustaining a nuclear 
plant addiction – hindered the antinuclear power movement from taking off.   
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Second, another reason for the “nuclear blind spot” was the inability of antinuclear 
groups to tap into victim-centered activism, which was popular in Japanese civil society.  “Until 
two workers died in an accident at a uranium reprocessing facility north of Tokyo in 1999, 
nuclear power generation in Japan was an industry without fatalities, and there have been no 
documented civilian fatalities to date” from the meltdown at Fukushima Daiichi.179  This made 
the antinuclear movement unable to compete for attention against high-profile victims’ 
movements; because activists in Japan typically focused on victim-centered issues and not on 
preventative causes concerning radiation or other potential pollutants, nuclear power was left off 
their agenda.180   
 To summarize, the lack of antinuclear true believers and environmental activists at the 
time of the Fukushima nuclear disaster can be explained by the “decades of largely passive 
acceptance of nuclear power” by the Japanese people and the resulting “nuclear blind spot” in 
Japanese civil society.181  Because true believers and activists are the types of protesters more 
likely to be effective mobilizers, their absence helps explain the lack of sustained mass protest 
mobilization during the first fifteen months after 3.11.   
 
4.1.2 – Amateur Protesters: Women and Freeters 
 In the absence of long-standing antinuclear activists, amateur protesters were well 
represented in the early post-3.11 antinuclear movement.  Akihiro Ogawa, who was at the March, 	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April, September, and October 2011 protests to conduct an ethnographic study, supports this 
claim: 
There were many “rally beginners,” who had never before participated in a 
political demonstration rally in order to express their will; several people with 
whom I spoke said that they were coming to this kind of rally for the first time. In 
fact, the organizers distributed an advice leaflet instructing activists to drink water 
properly since they would be walking for an hour (the weather was hot), wear 
comfortable shoes, wear hats, and follow the instructions of the staff.182  
 
I argue that the early protesters, comprised of many women and freeters, fall under the latter two 
categories of protesters: regular citizens who came together around the specific issue and 
spontaneous protesters, both of which are less effective in mobilization.   
 
Women 
After the Fukushima disaster, one group highly involved in the early antinuclear 
movement was women, particularly women with children. The following reports highlight their 
participation:  
• A Japan Times article, published in July 2011, highlighted how “Japanese mothers, many 
with no history of political activism, have started taking to the streets to urge the 
government to protect their children from radiation leaking from the crippled Fukushima 
No. 1 nuclear plant.”183   
• On 27 October 2011, about two hundred women sat outside the METI office for a three-
day sit-in to demand the “evacuation of children from areas with high radiation levels and 	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the permanent shut down of nuclear reactors in Japan currently switched off.”184  
Greenpeace provides the following description of the event:   
[The women’s] peaceful protest is a powerful – almost radical – act in a 
country where standing up for something can often mean ostracism from 
one’s community. These are not women who regularly participate in civil 
protest. These are mothers who fear for their children’s safety and future. 
These are grandmothers separated from their families.185 
 
• On 11 November 2011, Women of Fukushima Against Nukes organized a “sit-in in 
Tokyo calling for the permanent evacuation of at-risk children in areas of high radiation – 
and also the permanent shut down of nuclear reactors that are currently shut off in 
Japan.”186 
• In December 2011, “more than 100 antinuclear demonstrators, most of them women, met 
with officials of the Nuclear Safety Commission…and handed over a statement calling 
for a transparent investigation into the accident and a permanent shutdown of all nuclear 
power plants.”187  According to Aileen Miyoko Smith, leader of Green Action (an NGO 
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promoting renewable energy), mothers made up the grassroots movements that worked to 
terminate the operation of all 50 nuclear plants by 2012.188   
• Up to two years after the disaster in 2013, mothers continued to participate in and 
organize antinuclear activities.  On 7 July 2013, NHK News reported that “hundreds of 
mothers staged an anti-nuclear rally in Tokyo…one day before power firms apply to 
restart 5 nuclear plants under new safety standards.  The organizer said about 500 women 
gathered in front of the prime minister's office.”189  For this particular event, in order 
allow more voices to be heard, the women collected “about 20,000 anti-nuclear 
messages…from across the country for the rally.”190    
• The active role Japanese women played in opposing nuclear power has inspired other 
women around the world to do the same.  The Taipei Times reported that “female leaders 
of the anti-nuclear power movement in Taiwan…became involved in the issue and the 
development of the movement because they were confident that women could play a 
“pivotal” role in the [antinuclear] campaign.”  Irene Chen, a Taiwanese celebrity and a 
leader of the antinuclear power movement, credits reading about the women in Japan as 
“her inspiration” for taking action.191  Likewise, in India, women learned about the active 
ways through which the women of Fukushima stood up against nuclear power and 
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concluded that “whether it’s in India or Japan, [people] need to stop romanticizing 
nuclear power as a symbol of national pride and strength.”192 
Why did these Japanese women choose to participate in the antinuclear protest events?  
From the examples provided above, we gather that mothers in particular, out of a high level of 
concern that radiation would adversely affect their children and their family lives, were active in 
voicing their opposition to nuclear power.  Women were compelled to get involved with the 
grassroots antinuclear movement for the following five reasons:  First, we know from the 
broader literature that “one consistent result from poll data is that women are more likely to 
oppose nuclear than men.”193  Second, as the parent more likely to be involved with raising 
children, mothers experience a greater sense of burden when having to make decisions while 
faced with the possibility of radiation poisoning.  We see this dynamic play out with couples 
directly affected by the disaster: while men were more likely accept the government’s evaluation 
that radiation levels were safe and therefore remain in the Fukushima area, women were more 
likely to want to leave the region with their children in order to ensure their safety.194  In fact, 
after the disaster, high levels of family stress have been reported, and “marital discord has 
become so widespread that the phenomenon of couples breaking up has a name: genpatsu rikon 
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or ‘atomic divorce.’”195 Furthermore, questions about whether or not women can safely become 
pregnant or how children can be best shielded from radiation effects have fallen predominantly 
on women’s shoulders.  Third, women from Fukushima are reported to have experienced a 
greater degree of social stigma than men from the nuclear plant meltdowns.  Much like the 
stigma that was attached to the victims of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki’s atomic bombings where 
women could not find husbands due to fears that they had been tainted by radiation,196 prejudice 
against women from Fukushima has also been pervasive: 
Many negative comments in the media and on websites insinuate that Fukushima 
women are “damaged goods.” Even some people who are supposedly on the side 
of radiation victims are prepared to throw them on the reproductive scrap heap.  
Last year, prominent antinuclear activist Hobun Ikeya, the head of the Ecosystem 
Conservation Society of Japan, said at a public meeting: “People from Fukushima 
should not marry because the deformity rate of their babies will skyrocket.”197 
 
Fourth, the Fukushima nuclear meltdown and the resulting dispersion of radiation gave the 
antinuclear movement the opportunity to use a victim-centered strategy to pitch the antinuclear 
position to women.  Women – especially those from Fukushima – could view themselves as 
victims of social stigma or their children as vulnerable victims of radiation, supplying reasons to 
engage in contentious politics.  Fifth, much like the postwar disarmament movement, which used 
women’s positions as mothers to rally them,198 the post-Fukushima antinuclear power movement 
appealed to women in a similar way.  As Slater writes, “From the perspective of the ‘natural’ 	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obligation of reproduction and nurturing another generation [mothers] cannot suffer in silence; 
they cannot accept some collateral damage as inevitable; to do so would be irresponsible to their 
children’s and to Japan’s future.”199  
Given that most of these women were normal citizens who became concerned about 
nuclear power and radiation stemming from concerns about family stress, protection of children, 
food safety, stigmatization, and reproductive health – as opposed to being activists – I conclude 
that women fit into the third category of protesters (citizens gathered around a single issue).  
Other clues involving past protest participation rates, time constraints, and loose political ties 
support this characterization of women as non-activists, providing an explanation of why 
sustained mobilization was deterred.  First, although their antinuclear opinions are not surprising, 
the fact that Japanese women would participate in demonstrations to express those views is both 
new and notable.  The 2005 World Values Survey shows that only 7% of Japanese women have 
experienced participating in lawful/peaceful demonstrations, compared to almost double that 
percentage for men (13.8%).200  Not only did women report low participation rates, they also 
expressed a low inclination to protest.201  The same survey reports that 65.2% of women in Japan 
felt that attending a lawful/peaceful demonstration was something they “would never do” 
(compared to 50.1% of men who expressed that view).202  When broken down by employment 
status, housewives were even less likely to demonstrate: only 6.4% of Japanese housewives had 	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demonstrated before, whereas 70.9% of them said it was something they “would never do.”203  
Given these survey results, we can conclude that women in Japan are less likely to be involved in 
demonstrations and that their active participation in the post-3.11 early demonstrations was a 
special effort to oppose a single issue, nuclear power.  Second, in order to participate in events 
like the July 2011 sit-in, women had to “put their own lives and families on hold for these three 
days.”204  Launching a sustained protest movement would have demanded even bigger sacrifices 
than a single sit-in.  Third, women in Japan have looser ties to political parties and therefore lack 
the top-down push that would be useful for sustained mobilization.205  On one hand, they have 
been active in NGOs and other grassroots organizations, and since the 1970s when women won 
the right to vote, they have been turning out to national and local elections in high numbers.  On 
the other hand, despite willingness to participate in political events, women have experienced a 
significant lack of political leadership and ties to political parties. 206  In the long run, these ties 
are important to growing and sustaining a movement, given that being vocal about one’s views is 
not enough to gain political traction or effect change.   
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Freeters 
Freeter comes from the combination of the words “freelance” and “arbeiter” (arbeit 
means work in German) and refers to part-time or temporary young workers in Japan.207  Several 
decades ago, Japanese society was thought to be largely middle-class and sometimes even 
described as “90 percent middle-class.”208  However, due to a recession that started in the 1990s 
and continued to the mid-2000s as well as neoliberal policies, many youths were forced out of 
regular employment into the flexible workforce.209  These freeters receive little employment 
protection and low wages, placing them in a precarious economic and social position in Japanese 
society.  Essentially, freeters are the functional equivalent of young precariats, “a neologism that 
combines the adjective precarious and the noun proletariat.”210  In his book about precariats, 
Standing describes them as disaffected and dispirited people who see little hope for 
improvement.211  Recent statistics from the MHLW show that 38.7% of workers in Japan are in 
the flexible, non-regular workforce.212 
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Anecdotal evidence suggests that in addition to women, freeters were some of the first 
protesters of nuclear power immediately after the 3.11 disaster: 
• About one week after the 3.11 disaster, a freeter named Ryota Sona, stood before TEPCO 
headquarters shouting for the elimination of nuclear plants.   According to Ogawa, 
“Sono’s direct action consequently ignited a series of rallies against the nuclear energy 
policy, in which participants asked for the abolition of all nuclear plants and the 
development of such alternative energy sources as solar, wind, and liquid natural gas.”213  
• Around the same time, The Amateur’s Riot (Shiroto no ran), a freeter group, organized 
several protests.  The Amateur’s Riot is an urban network, formed in 2005 and based near 
Kōenji Station in Tokyo where they manage recycle shops, a cafe, and some free 
space.214  This group was responsible for gathering together thousands of people in 
Tokyo on 10 April, 7 May, and 11 June 2011 for protests.215   
• The well-attended 10 April 2011 protest, in particular, is credited to the leadership of The 
Amateur’s Riot organizers and the wide participation of freeters.  The organizers had 
applied for a permit to demonstrate, telling police that they expected 500 participants.  
Instead, 15,000 demonstrators turned up at the event.  According to Kindstrand, the 
original low estimate was “not…an indicator of pessimism, but exactly as the sort of 
tongue-in-cheek humor that has put the Koenji-based The Amateur’s Riot (Shiroto no 
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ran) on the map of resistance culture in Japan. Within just a few years, they have become 
an important node of a new wave of autonomous political activism, popularly referred to 
as the ‘precariat movement.’”216  Other scholars also observed significant participation by 
freeters in April 2011.  According to Tanaka, “those who started protests in Tokyo’s 
Koenji area were mainly people in their 30s who have been involved in campaigns 
demanding better treatment for non-permanent employees.  In the beginning, it was this 
stratum of people who took the leading role in the demonstrations calling for an end to 
nuclear power in Japan.”217  These freeters were motivated not only out of fear of 
radiation, but also anger towards to government for its poor management of the situation 
and its limited disclosure of information.  Likewise, Asia One reported that the crowd 
was composed of “people mainly in their 20s and 30s.”218   
• Kindstrand sums up the first four months following the disaster by noting, “Most 
remarkable is the demographics central to the mobilization of this emerging political 
subjectivity, for it is the freeter – those young ‘irregular’ workers of the post-bubble ‘lost 
decade’ who with their labor continued to sustain the service economy of Japan, Inc. even 
as it abandoned them – who have taken to the streets in collective disapproval.”219   
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• Later in September 2011, when a group of tents were set up outside the METI as “a 
makeshift gathering place…about 1,000 people, many in their 20s and 30s, gathered daily 
from around the country to express their objections to METI’s efforts to restart nuclear 
plants without thorough investigations into why Fukushima No. 1 occurred.”220   
• Ogawa documented the “Goodbye Nuclear Power Plants” (Sayonara Genpatsu) rally that 
mobilized in central Tokyo on September 19, 2011, as well as the Occupy Tokyo action 
on October 15, 2011, and found that “the most distinctive phenomenon [of these early 
antinuclear protests] was the participation of young people.”221   
• Freeters and first-time demonstrators continued to be highlighted in subsequent reports 
of the mid-2012 antinuclear rallies.  For example, the New York Times reported in June 
2012 that young protesters “described their outrage over the restart decision as a moment 
of political awakening, saying they were taking to the streets for the first time.”222   
In addition to these reports, there is evidence to indirectly link freeters to the early protest 
movement from studies that have been done to describe freeter-style protests.  According to 
Yoshitaka, recent freeter protests “are different from traditional Marxist political ones and even 
from the new social movements in the 1960s and 1970s in the sense that they incorporate more 
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cultural practices such as art, music, dance and performance into their political activities.”223  
The Amateur’s Riot, in particular, is known for their “playful forms of public protest.”224  The 
founder of the first Amateur’s Riot recycle shop, Matsumoto Hajime, believes that protest 
activities should create a “post-revolutionary world in advance” and demonstrate to others how 
fun contentious activities can be.225  
Those who attended the antinuclear protests in 2011 sometimes described them as 
“festivals,” suggesting the possibility of freeter influence.   For example, the 10 April 2011 
protest was dubbed the “Great Anti-Nuclear Rock Festival Demo in Kōenji.”226  Asia One 
reported that “although placards and banners held by protesters expressed anger and 
frustration—‘Stop polluting the air and water,’ ‘Don't trust the government’—the atmosphere 
was festive, with many people in costumes, bands giving live performances at the park before the 
march, and groups of musicians playing drums, rock and traditional Japanese festival music 
while people walked.”227  Referring to the protests before June 2011, Ogawa wrote that “the 
antinuclear protests have so far resembled bohemian carnivals rather than what many in the West 
would describe as genuine protests, with an eclectic melange of clowns, musicians, and street 
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performers interspersed amongst pedestrians.”228  The 9 October 2011 march held in Tokyo’s 
Shibuya district was described similarly as “a particularly noisy affair as participants banged 
drums, even frying pans, and blew trumpets to attract attention.”229  A curious employee of a 
nearby restaurant wanted to know what the commotion was all about; when interviewed, he said, 
"I thought it was some kind of festival, but then I realized it was only a demonstration."230  The 
early protest participants themselves noted the festival atmosphere: “one individual who has 
participated in a number of antinuclear protests since April does so because they are so enjoyable 
and quite unlike professional organized protests of the past where people were forced to take 
part.”231 
These reports suggest that freeters joined in protest against nuclear power stemming from 
their desire to voice their anger and frustration with government, to experience being part of a 
movement, and to have fun – all signs suggesting that they are not long-time antinuclear true 
believers or activists, but instead fall into the third or fourth category of protesters.  Several other 
things we know about freeters, such as their protest participation history, spontaneous 
demonstration style, lack of resources, and concern with other issues support this argument and 
suggest reasons why mobilization was difficult.  First, just as women and housewives in Japan 
thought that participating in demonstrations would be something they “would never do” prior to 
3.11, young people and part-time workers likewise had little experience or interest in 	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demonstrating.  The 2005 World Values Survey showed that only 2.2% of people aged 15-29 and 
3.4% of people 30-49 had reported participating in lawful/peaceful demonstrations compared to 
17.2% of people aged 50 and above.232  Although this pattern is not unexpected given that older 
individuals may have been presented with more opportunities to demonstrate over their lifetimes, 
the increase from the 30-49 age group to the 50 and above age group is substantial.  Additionally, 
results from the same survey show that young people are also less inclined to participate in 
protest: 72.1% and 65.3% of people aged 15-29 and 30-49, respectively, saw participating in 
demonstration as something they “would never do.”233  Moreover, when broken down by 
employment, 61.3% of part-time workers viewed demonstrating as something they “would never 
do.”234  This is telling, given that one would expect part-time workers not face the same sort of 
constraints that salaried workers face.  These findings reinforce the point that people from the 
freeter generation were largely amateurs, not activists. 
Second, the freeter style of protest that welcomed spontaneity was not conducive to 
sustaining a movement.  Freeters would gather “by word-of-mouth on social media, [attend] the 
protests as if joining a festival, and [disperse] to return home when they saw fit” indicating that 
sustaining a mass mobilization against nuclear power was not their on their agenda.235  The 
following report suggests that demonstrating was spontaneous:  
Since April 2011, Tokyoites have often, mostly on a monthly basis, come to see 
the anti-nuclear rallies in the central Tokyo districts, such as Shibuya and 	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Shinjuku, ignited by Sono’s action on March 20….The series of demonstrations 
against nuclear plants has attracted thousands of young people. Apparently, 
however, they are not a mobilized force. Instead, they spontaneously came to the 
rally sites after watching Ustream, which was broadcast live from the site.  They 
were also receiving messages from such social networking media as Twitter. “I 
came to know through Twitter that something interesting seems to be happening.  
That’s why I came here. I just want to change present-day Japan,” said one young 
woman who was walking next to me.236 
 
Third, freeters are extremely disillusioned with and distrustful of government and they lack 
"sufficient financial resources [and] political voices."237 Fourth, their opposition to nuclear 
power was intertwined with anger against socioeconomic discrepancies in the nuclear power 
industry.  For example, Sono, the precariat who sparked the early demonstrations, was arrested 
on September 23 for demonstrating against discrimination and exclusion.  When asked for his 
reason for participating in a rally that was unrelated to nuclear issues, his reply is telling: 
Actually, everything is connected. Think about that: nuclear plants are always 
built in rural, marginal, coastal countryside. Nuclear plants are never built in 
Tokyo. The contamination does not happen equally to everybody.  People who do 
not have work in the rural areas and then will [have no choice but to] work at 
nuclear power plants [if they want a job at all] will be the first target of radiation 
exposure. …Thus, I believe nuclear plants are based on discrimination. My 
actions are connected in a straight line.238  
 
Like Sono, some freeters participated in the post 3.11 demonstrations not because they were 
long-time antinuclear true believers or environmental activists, but because they identified with 
the plight of rural, marginal prefectures that host nuclear plants.  They see that “the economic 
affluence that Japanese people enjoy is based on the sacrifice of people living in rural, marginal 
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areas” and feel that Japan’s “current economic prosperity is based on the sacrifice…of their right 
to have decent work.”239  The antinuclear protests served as an opportunity for them to express 
their anger about the state of society in Japan. Therefore, given all of these facts about freeters, it 
would be consistent with their political identity to spontaneously join in protests and voice their 
displeasure, but not concern themselves with starting a sustained movement, or even seeing their 
causes gain political traction and showing up at the polls later in 2012. 
 
 The preponderance of amateur protesters present during the early months after the 
disaster helps explain the absence of immediate sustained mass mobilization.  Using two lines of 
argument, I showed that the two types of protesters that are typically more effective in 
mobilization were missing: first, antinuclear true believers and activists were largely absent 
when the disaster struck due to a long-standing “nuclear blind spot” in Japanese civil society; 
and second, the women and freeters who were demonstrably active during the early protests 
were ordinary citizens opposing nuclear power out of concerns about their families’ health and 
spontaneous protesters. Given that Japan had not experienced large-scale demonstrations for 
around 40 years, many of the post-Fukushima protesters – including the women and freeters 
already highlighted – were amateur and first-time protesters. 
 
4.2 – The Use of Social Media and Other Strategies 
The Metropolitan Coalition Against Nukes (MCAN) was formed at the end of 2011 to 
centralize and grow the antinuclear movement after the disaster.  MCAN brought together 
numerous antinuclear groups and became the main organizer of many of the subsequent 
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demonstrations.  The first protest organized by MCAN was held on 14 January 2012 with a small 
group of 300 people; then, as we see from the numbers in the previous section, thousands of 
demonstrators were mobilized in just a few months.240  The use of social media platforms for 
mobilization can explain how so many participants could be gathered so quickly, but it can also 
explain why sustained mass mobilization was inhibited.  
 McAdam, Gould, and Diani and McAdam, have found networks to be a necessary 
element of protest mobilization structure.241  Networks are critical because they connect 
individuals to a cause and allow them to circulate information amongst themselves about their 
strategic situation (e.g. available means of action, opportunities, etc.).  More recent research has 
shown that increasing use of digital networks allowing for speedier and more sizable protests.242 
I argue that social media platforms such as Twitter and blogs played key roles in quickly 
gathering ordinary people for single events; however, such methods were, on the whole, limiting 
for the post-3.11 antinuclear movement because they encouraged speed, but lacked the 
traditional person-to-person networks that traditional forms of mobilization would have created 
to sustain a protest movement.   
In Japan, social media have grown and evolved as a means of communication and 
personal expression that are outside the realm of established institutions and traditional networks 	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involving family, work, and school.  After 3.11 these existing online social networks were put to 
use to generate and distribute information about the disaster.  The Internet became an important 
medium through which people articulated and mobilized antinuclear sentiment.  According to 
Slater, Nishimura and Kindstrand, online efforts “[led] directly to the organization of protest 
[and served] as productive platforms for the politics of protest.”243 For example, the 11 June 
2011 demonstration was organized through Twitter and Facebook: 
This movement consists of innumerable voices and actions….Like the web, it has 
no “head,” no center. In this sense, the political rally held at Aruta-mae-hiroba 
(plaza), Shinjuku, Tokyo, on June 11 was a symbolic event. In this place, at least 
10,000 people were said to have gathered, brought together from information 
distributed on Twitter or Facebook alone.244 
 
Next, in July 2011, mothers “organized antinuclear energy rallies nationwide attended by 
thousands of protesters” using social media.245  In another example, the Amateur’s Riot was able 
to successfully promote their protest events despite the lack of coverage from mass media.  They 
set up Twitter accounts and used hashtags strategically to disseminate information and gather 
large numbers of demonstrators.246  Later on 13 October 2011, The Asahi Shimbun reported that 
the protests seemed “not to have any solid leaders. People who came to know each other 
virtually through social media then got together physically through their common belief that 
something is wrong in this society.”247  At a protest the following week, “one of the rally 
organizers, Keiko Ochiai, commented later that she herself was impressed with the rally 	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participants who came to the site after they had collected information for themselves and had 
decided on their own whether to participate or not….The members of the younger generation 
who are familiar with such social networking devices were able to find out what was actually 
going on in grassroots Japan, although the major Japanese media, including the state-run 
broadcaster NHK, have totally ignored the demonstrations.”248  In yet another example, an 
antinuclear group, The Citizen’s Vote to Decide Together on Nuclear Power, started a petition 
that called for nuclear power referenda.  This petition drive was carried out entirely through 
social networking without support from trade unions, businesses, or other organizations.249  
The main organizer of antinuclear demonstrations, MCAN, used the Internet and social 
media forms, like Twitter, to maintain “a loosely woven network.”250  A look at protest numbers 
leading up to the start of the sustained mobilization period shows just how successfully MCAN 
was able gather people quickly using these methods:  While they started with 300 people on 14 
January 2012, by the first-year anniversary of the 3.11 disaster, 14,000 demonstrators were 
mobilized.251  Then, during its peak in June 2012, the number of people who showed up to 
protest spiked:  event organizers estimated that 150,000-200,000 people participated in the rallies, 
while the police put the number at 17,000.252  
In Japan’s case, I argue that online social media-based mobilization has been both 
beneficial and limiting for the antinuclear protest movement.  On one hand, the central role of 	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social media seemed to contribute to the large and diverse crowds of demonstrators.  First, online 
mobilization “enabled collaboration between a wide range of different groups,” providing an 
arena in which diverse groups of people could unite under the antinuclear position.253  Second, 
“the ability to ‘cross-post’ by tagging and retagging information allowed groups with little 
previous connection to work together in ways that did not require intensive…institutional and 
face-to-face contact” – a development which may have eased the demonstration planning 
process.254  Third, platforms like Twitter made it easy for interested individuals to search through 
the tags in order to find images, videos, and up-to-date information about protests events, 
eliminating the need to be already involved in an activist group or personally know another 
protest participant.  Fourth, social media platforms can reduce the costs of collective action by 
allowing people to communicate, gather, and organize free of charge.  
On the other hand, while web-based mobilization brought together a large number of 
diverse individuals for single protest events, it also limited the ability of the antinuclear 
movement to grow a centralized, sustained group of regular demonstrators.  First, studying 
protest recruitment and mass mobilization patterns in the Twitter network, González-Bailón et al.  
found that “a small core of central users is still critical to trigger chains of messages of high 
orders of magnitude, [and that] centrality in the network of followers is still a meaningful 
measure of influence in online networks at least in the context of mass mobilizations.”255  Second, 
because Internet-based mobilization does not require a centralized or formalized leadership base 	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to strategize for mobilization, movements dependent on flexible online networks may suffer 
from lowered coherence in the articulation of their goals and ideology and more difficulty in 
decision-making.256 Third, and perhaps most important of all, web-based mobilization networks 
typically lack the interpersonal ties that allow for consistent collective identities to be formed and 
new members to be mobilized.257  
Interpersonal ties are critical.  Snow et al. find that “the probability of being recruited into 
a particular movement is largely a function of two conditions [one of them being] links to one or 
more movement members through a pre-existing or emergent interpersonal tie.”258  Similarly, 
McAdam and Paulsen found that commitment to a shared identity, reinforced by strong ties to 
participants, contributes to mobilization.259  In these three ways, social media-driven 
mobilization can inhibit the prospects for sustained protest mobilization, offering one possible 
explanation for the post-Fukushima fifteen-month delay.  These limiting effects are true not only 
of the post-Fukushima antinuclear moment but common in other web-based mobilizations 
around the world.  For example, Iran’s 2009 protests against the re-election of Ahmadinejad was 
nicknamed the “Twitter Revolution” for its widespread use of social media to rally 
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demonstrators, and it too experienced the same limiting effects of social-networking based 
mobilization.260 
Protest organizers in Germany and France also used social media to recruit demonstrators, 
but the difference between those countries and Japan is that Japan lacked the strong antinuclear 
base that these countries had.  While social media eliminated the sometimes troublesome face-to-
face contact that non-web mobilizations require, those traditional forms of contact are still 
necessary to establish a consistent and sustained social movement.  In the Japanese case, perhaps 
the use of online platforms such as Twitter encouraged the casual participation of massive groups 
of antinuclear individuals, but made it more difficult for civil society to rise to the more 
demanding challenge of mobilizing into sustained protests.  
 
Conclusion 
To show how the mobilization structure of the post-Fukushima antinuclear movement 
contributed to delayed sustained mass mobilization, I looked specifically at who the protesters 
were and what mobilization strategies were employed in the fifteen months after the disaster.  
First, the Fukushima disaster not only revealed the lack of a strong nuclear force in the country, 
but also shook many Japanese citizens out of their passive acceptance of nuclear power.  
Stemming from concerns about family or general frustration with the government, women and 
freeters spoke up in opposition against nuclear power.  These developments have been 
significant steps forward for the Japanese antinuclear movement, given the little attention it 
received from environmental movements before.  When comparing the German and Japanese 
environmental movements years ago, McKean found that “the intense opposition in Germany to 	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nuclear power rather than other environmental threats, the reliance of marches and 
demonstrations as tactics, and the conspicuous presence of young people all contrast with 
Japan.”261  Much of this has changed since Fukushima.  Second, the use of online social media to 
recruit participants allowed organizers to maintain a loose network of interested individuals, 
enabled collaboration across different groups of people, and encouraged quick dissemination of 
information about protests events; however, Internet-based mobilization strategies could not 
replace the more traditional strategies that would have required a stable, centralized core and 
face-to-face contacts – both of which might have allowed sustained mass mobilization to occur 
earlier.  This evidence provides support for internal-capacities focused Hypothesis 2b that 
limitations in mobilization structure were a major factor in the post-3.11 mobilization delay.   
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Section 5 
Conclusion 
5.1 – Summary of Findings 
After the March 2011 meltdown of Fukushima Daiichi’s nuclear plant, the Japanese 
public went from being passively accepting of nuclear power to being strongly opposed to it.  
Although the public expressed its antinuclear sentiment in survey data and occasional rallies, it 
did not mobilize into sustained mass protests until June 2012.   The peculiarity of this 15-month 
delay in mobilization becomes clear when compared to the speed of other mobilizations 
following large nuclear accidents.  For example, protesters mobilized almost immediately in the 
United States after the Three Mile Island accident and in West Germany after the Chernobyl 
disaster.  Furthermore, after the Fukushima accident, mobilized protests erupted in Germany 
almost immediately, but not in Japan, the country hosting the nuclear plant and bearing the bulk 
of the radiation.  Why did Japan’s 15-month mobilization delay occur?  In this thesis, I tested 
whether low levels of grievance, limited availability of resources, or types of mobilizing 
structure and strategies help to explain this delay.   
Hypothesis 1, which states that there was insufficient grievance after the disaster to 
prompt mobilization, was not supported.  In fact, both objective grievance (measured by 
environmental and economic devastation) and subjective grievance (measured by fear of 
radiation and uncertainty about the future, distrust of government, and disapproval of 
government policy) were very high.  Because grievance theory would have predicted a different 
outcome (the eruption of protests) based on the levels of grievance observed, I found that 
grievance theory does not successfully account for Japan’s post-3.11 mobilization delay.  From a 
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theoretical perspective, the null result suggests that grievance is not a sufficient condition for 
mobilization and is, at most, a necessary one.   
Instead of looking at the nuclear accident itself, Hypotheses 2a and 2b consider the 
internal capacities of the antinuclear movement that may have discouraged mass mobilization.  
Hypothesis 2a, which states that there was limited availability of resources available to the early 
antinuclear movement, thus delaying mobilization, was only partially supported.  On one hand, 
moral resources in the form of media attention appeared to be partially lacking; local mass media 
covered the Fukushima nuclear situation, but only sporadically covered the early antinuclear 
protests.  On the other hand, cultural and monetary resources were available.  These mixed 
findings suggest that internal-capacities theory focused on resource availability cannot account 
fully for the delayed mobilization after 3.11.  Perhaps resource availability theory would have 
generated a more suitable explanation had I considered the following questions: Are there certain 
resources that are important than others?  How might independent, Internet-based TV networks 
affect the necessity of traditional mass media?  Should monetary resources be deemphasized 
given that protests are inexpensive to organize and made even cheaper by the prevalent use of 
online social networks?  These are the questions I would take into consideration if I were to 
revisit resource availability theory in the future. 
Hypothesis 2b, which attributes the delayed mobilization to early antinuclear protests 
being composed of spontaneous protesters and regular citizens organized over one issue rather 
than true believers and activists – who are generally more effective in mobilizing support – did 
appear to be supported by evidence.  Due to a “nuclear blind spot” in Japanese civil society, 
there was a lack of established antinuclear true believers and activists (the two types of protesters 
known to be more effective at mobilizing).  Instead, many of the early protesters were regular 
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citizens gathered out of fear of radiation or others who joined spontaneously.  Notably 
represented among them were women and freeters, whose motivations for demonstrating support 
their categorization as amateur protesters and offer an explanation for the movement’s lack of 
sustained mass mobilization.  Additionally, the antinuclear movement’s heavy reliance on 
Internet-based mobilization through Twitter and other social media platforms allowed protest 
organizers to speedily amass large numbers of attendees for single events, but proved to be a 
poor substitute for more traditional forms of mobilization, which were necessary in order to 
maintain a network for a centralized and sustained movement.  Lack of longstanding antinuclear 
activists at the early rallies and the heavy reliance on Internet-mobilization contributed to delays 
in sustained mass mobilization.  Out of the three hypotheses tested in this thesis, Hypothesis 2b 
was best supported.  
While I found that mobilizing structure and strategy help to provide a well-supported 
explanation for why the Japanese antinuclear movement experienced delays, the Fukushima case 
alone cannot rule out or confirm the different theories.  Moreover, after studying post-Chernobyl 
antinuclear movements, Koopsman and Kuyvendak noted that there may be no single factor 
determining the movement’s trajectory.262  This may also be true for the post-Fukushima 
movement, in which mobilization structure and strategy as well as other factors were at work.  
 
5.2 – Implications and Future Prospects 
Given these findings, what implications might one draw about the state of Japanese civil 
society and the future prospects of the antinuclear movement?  First, with regard to civil society, 
the 3.11 nuclear meltdown and the resulting delay in antinuclear mobilization revealed a 	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weakness in Japanese civil society’s ability to effectively monitor the nuclear industry.  Prior to 
the crisis, this weakness allowed the “nuclear village” to push its agenda without pressure to 
consider safety standards.  After the crisis, this weakness meant that early antinuclear protests 
lacked the effective leadership of longstanding antinuclear true believers and activists.  Overall, 
3.11 highlights the weak advocacy role Japanese civil society played in keeping checks on a 
powerful nuclear industry that was effective in forestalling opposition. 
Second, with regard to future prospects, the fifteen-month delay marked only the 
beginning of the antinuclear movement’s uphill battle.  In spite of its ability to draw crowds of 
up to 200,000 demonstrators, the mobilized antinuclear movement has not been able to gain 
political traction.  A major setback to the movement came in the December 2012 lower house 
elections, when the largely antinuclear public elected the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) – an 
unabashedly pro-nuclear energy party – to power.  This was the people’s choice, despite the fact 
that there were other options: Yokiko Kada’s Japan Future Party, which is strongly antinuclear, 
and the incumbent DPJ, which drafted an energy proposal to phase out nuclear power by 2030.  
Although the contest was based on a multi-issue platform so people may have voted based on 
other core issues, this sidelining of the energy issue was a surprising turn of events given the 
saliency of the nuclear energy debate.  Japanese activists had certainly not expected this electoral 
outcome.  Before the election, Kazue Suzuki, a Greenpeace campaigner, stated, “This is the first 
election since the Fukushima nuclear disaster and if it does not result in an antinuclear 
government, that will be one of the wonders of the world….Since Fukushima, Germany rejected 
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nuclear power and Italy rejected nuclear power. If Japan can’t, the world will be amazed.”263  
The LDP “captured 294 seats in the 480- member lower house of parliament,” winning in a 
landslide victory.264 
Over the past year, it has become clear that apart from the vilification and downfall of 
TEPCO and the legitimization of antinuclear attitudes, the mobilized antinuclear movement in 
Japan has not yet achieved its overall aim to rid the country of its nuclear power dependence.  
According to Samuels, “3.11 had virtually no effect on the larger national strategy [of nuclear 
power].”265  There were times when the antinuclear movement seemed to make progress toward 
its goals, but their gains would soon be reversed.  For example, Prime Minister Kan Naoto shut 
down all nuclear reactors after the disaster, but two were turned back on the following year.  In 
another instance, Kan called for a “reset” of national energy policy, only to have his chief cabinet 
secretary insist that Japan’s “fundamental nuclear policy is not changing.”266  Similarly, the 
DPJ’s policy platform included plans to eventually phase out nuclear power by the 2030s, but the 
pro-nuclear LDP was elected to replace them.  One could say that Japanese antinuclear activism 
began slowly, and that its future prospects for creating change continue to be grim. 
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